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INTRODUCTION
World cooperation has generated a variety of supranational organiza-
tions, with responsibilities ranging from trade to crimes against
humanity.' These organizations often include judicial-like tribunals, and
these tribunals have and will increasingly create law. Together, they are
evolving a global legal culture.2 This legal culture will initially derive
from national legal cultures and yet, over time, will transform national
legal cultures. The legal principles that will guide this emerging global
legal culture must now be analyzed in order to gain some understanding
of the future. This Article offers aframework for thinking about the future
development of global legal systems.
The twin pillars of the immediate iteration of this global legal culture
will be the civil law and the common law systems. This prediction is not
mere transatlantic chauvinism. These legal systems have, for good and
bad reasons, migrated around the world. At present, 33.8% of the world's
jurisdictions, encompassing 55.6% of the world's population, are based
upon the civil law model, or civil law systems mixed with others (indige-
nous or religious legal ideologies, for example). The common law model,
along with systems mixed with it, include 28.24% of the jurisdictions,
and 14.68% of the world's population. Hence, combined, civil and com-
mon law-based legal cultures cover over 70% of the world's population
in over 62% of the jurisdictions.' Moreover, the two currently dominant
governments are the United States (U.S.) and the European Union
1. The term "supranational organization" is used for a particular type of international
organization that is "empowered to exercise directly some of the functions otherwise reserved to
states." Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997).
2. "Legal culture" is used here to encompass the panoply of societal elements associated
with a legal system. Lawrence Friedman, a United States legal sociologist, has focused on that
concept. While he noted that other scholars have used the term differently, his use of the term
"refers to ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institutions, which
some public or some part of the public holds." Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of Legal
Culture: A Reply, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 34 (David Nelken ed., 1997). He intended
that what falls within this term is "living law." Id. at 36. The term is criticized for lack of rigor
and coherence: "The imprecision of these formulations makes it hard to see what exactly the
concept covers and what the relationship is between the various elements said to be included
within its scope." Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CUL-
TURES 13, 15 (David Nelken ed., 1997). Cotterrell conceded that it is useful "for its emphasis on
the sheer complexity and diversity of the social matrix in which contemporary state legal sys-
tems exist." Id. at 29. In this Article's discussion, breadth is much preferred to precision, and
hence the term seems appropriate.
3. See University of Ottawa, World Legal Systems, at http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/
world-legal-systems/eng-systeme.html (Oct. 1, 2003) (information about jurisdiction); see also
World Legal Systems Website, at http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/
eng-tabl .html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (information about population).
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(E.U.). 4 The U.S., with due respect to its country of origin, England,
represents the common law system, albeit its own version. The E.U. has
largely adopted civil law concepts, again with due respect to England and
Ireland's common law presence in the E.U., and hence, will add strength
to consideration of civil law principles. For these reasons, the first steps
toward a global legal culture will be dominated by some blending of civil
law and common law.
Of course, analysis based on the merger of these systems can only
provide a plausible beginning in envisioning the global legal culture be-
cause, as recognized below, other customary and indigenous legal
cultures, many of which have mixed with the two transatlantic systems,
will certainly have increasing impact on the global legal culture. Any pre-
diction of global culture in any regard faces claims of overwhelming
diversity, but we have seen an unprecedented merging of cultures in re-
cent times in the face of such cultural diversity. The development of
supranational organizations such as the E.U. demonstrates the develop-
ment of an integrated legal culture in the face of seemingly incompatible
and even belligerent histories. In sum, it is plausible to conceive of a
global legal culture, even in the face of great diversity, and to forecast that
the early stages of that legal culture will borrow a good deal from civil
law and common law experiences.
Careful consideration of this emerging legal culture has become an
imperative. As a U.S. legal scholar, I feel a particular sense of urgency in
that enterprise. Other legal regimes, both supranational and national, have
increasing impact on U.S. legal practice and U.S. laws. Yet, few U.S.
4. The term "E.U. law" in this Article is a concession to popular usage. Technically, it is
a misnomer. Hanlon provided one brief description of the correct nomenclature:
The TEU [Treaty of European Union or Maastricht Treaty] created the 'European
Union'. It consists of three 'Pillars'. In the middle are three existing Communities,
(i.e. ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community], Eurotom and the E.C. [European
Community]). These three Communities will be known collectively as the European
Communities. It will be noted that the TEU officially changed the name to E.C.,
dropping the "Economic" from the title. On either side of this central "Pillar" is the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA). These three "Pillars" support the over-arching constitutional order of
the Union. However, only the central Pillar, the E.C., is governed by Community law.
The CFSP Pillar and the JHA Pillar are governed by intergovernmental cooperation.
This means they are outside the jurisdiction of the Community institutions, particu-
larly the Court of Justice. Neither will any of the Articles of the outside Pillars be
enforceable, or challengeable, in National Courts. Thus, although the Union is wider
than the European Community it has its roots in the Community.
JAMES HANLON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 9 (2d ed. 2000). Another justification for an
inclusive sense of "E.U. law" is that the future will almost surely see a body of law covering all
three pillars, although many of the aspects of the two "outside" pillars will be ruled more by
politics than law as in the U.S.
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lawyers have more than mere superficial knowledge of other legal sys-
tems. While legal systems are generally local and nationalistic, the U.S.
legal culture has remained even more isolated than most. On the other
hand, lawyers from other legal systems have been studying the U.S. sys-
tem, often from the inside (obtaining U.S. law degrees and participating
in U.S. firms), for generations. To a large extent, the health of the U.S.
legal culture and effectiveness of U.S. practitioners depend on how
quickly its practitioners and scholars can catch up.
To encourage all, but particularly U.S., lawyers to think about trans-
formation of the law, this Article will envision a global legal regime. The
purpose is more reflective than predictive. Nominally, the Article has
three parts. The first Part offers an overview description of the emerging
supranational legal institutions and the major forces moving them. The
next Part will outline civil law legal concepts and provide background for
common law readers. To further the goal of this Article, it will do so as it
suggests some issues that will arise as the civil law system is incorporated
into the global legal system. The last Part will move to the Article's major
goal of setting up a framework for contemplating the basis on which a
global legal culture might evolve, to some extent, on the merger of this
globalized version of civil law thinking with U.S. common law thinking.
Some effort is made to suggest how other major legal cultures may im-
pact on this system but with the recognition that thinking about the
interaction of the two major transatlantic systems is sufficiently ambitious
for one Article.
Actually, the analysis is a unit presented in three stages: institutions,
civil law overview, and then the blending of the civil law and common
law legal cultures. The first stage of the analysis looks to the experience
and development of four centralizing regimes with global impact: the
U.S., Europe, the United Nations (U.N.), and the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). Since the work is about legal culture the concentration is on
the adjudicative institutions of these four organizations. Largely for back-
ground, the piece looks to the experience of the U.S. federal courts and
the European trade and human rights regimes. The U.S. provides the pre-
diction with 200 years of experience, and Europe provides it with about
50 years. The latter experience is more relevant because it is a recent
uniting of a number of national legal cultures. Just as useful to this analy-
sis is the fact that Europe has taken some steps in melding civil law and
common law legal cultures. The U.N. engages in human rights creation,
promotion and enforcement. Its International Court of Justice (ICJ) pre-
sents a plausible and, in fact, working global tribunal for those purposes.
It will also provide some experience in unifying a legal culture. Like
Europe, the global regime has a trade regime separate from its human
[Vol. 25:1
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rights regime. The trade regime now has the WTO to promote and protect
trade values. The WTO has its own court-like bodies. Again, the WTO
adjudicative apparatus is presented more as a plausible vehicle for devel-
oping global law, but it also provides a centralizing experience. The
European experience demonstrates that this putative trade regime will
ultimately affect almost every aspect of national law, indeed society in
general. Like Europe, both the U.N.'s rights tribunal and the WTO's trade
tribunal have been and must continue to deal with the tension between
civil law and common law ideologies. So, we have plausible nascent
world tribunals and we can engage in at least some preliminary thoughts
about evolution of a global legal culture recognizing that these tribunals
might be the vehicles for carrying it forward.
Now we can begin the job of contemplating what this global legal
culture will look like. As stated, about half the world's population is liv-
ing under some form of civil law system. Thus, it is imperative that
common law lawyers and scholars understand some of the basic tenets of
a civil law legal system in order to engage in predictions about a global
legal culture. Underneath this discussion, and continued into the next
stage, is the observation that there are subtle but fundamental ideological
differences between civil and common law legal thinking, despite some
appearance of convergence between the two great transatlantic systems.
Our task also requires sufficient understanding of the civil law model in
order to form thoughts about the melding of that model with the common
law approach. While these two legal systems have common cultural as
well as legal sources, a person from a civil law system will have a differ-
ent intuitive understanding of law than someone from a common law
system. The task here is to gain enough understanding to contemplate
how a civil law legal mind will think about an issue on the world stage.
Thus, this Part also projects the civil law ideology into the global legal
culture in order to move the analysis forward, as well as offer some
common understanding of the civil law model.
Finally, we can blend in the common law. A separate discussion of
the common law ideology does not seem necessary because I anticipate
that most of the readers will come from a common law legal culture,
more precisely the U.S. An understanding of the basic tenets of the com-
mon law model is presented in the discussion of the interaction of the two
models. The primary goal of this stage of the analysis is to identify areas
of tension between common law and civil law ideologies. Nonetheless, I
suggest potential resolutions of those areas of tension. More ambitiously,
I identify certain aspects of these models that might best be adapted to the
global legal culture. These suggestions will be set up by the efforts in the
second stage to suggest how a given aspect of the civil law system might
Fall 20031
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emerge in the global legal culture. Some much more cautious attempts are
made to identify aspects of other legal cultures, e.g., Islamic or Asian, that
might have impact on the current development of the global legal culture.
I recognize that a variety of potential legal ideas may be adapted from
other legal cultures, or develop from the creative energies of future gen-
erations, but contemplating those is simply too much at this point.
Hopefully, these three analytical stages come together in the readers
mind to present a framework for analysis. Some effort is made to engage
in divination. It is simply irresistible to do otherwise, but the real goal of
this piece is to lay groundwork and encourage thinking about the dimen-
sions of a global legal culture. Although I encourage U.S. lawyers and
legal scholars especially to become engaged, all the citizens of the world
must be active in the design of the global legal culture.
I. EMERGING GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE FORCES
THAT WILL SHAPE THEIR LAWS
This Part examines the judicial-like tribunals that will contribute to
the global legal culture. It focuses on the two major global adjudicative
institutions, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement
apparatus and the United Nation's (U.N.) human rights adjudications. In
order to suggest the impact these tribunals may have, and how they may
contribute to the evolution of a global legal regime, it looks at the evolu-
tion of the European legal regime and, to a lesser extent, the centralization
of U.S. law over its history.
A. Present and Future World Judicial Regimes
Two parallel nascent global judicial regimes are evolving in a
world-wide legal culture: the trade adjudicators and rights adjudicators.
Trade adjudicators began to evolve when the WTO's "Dispute Settlement
Bodies" (DSB) were created. An ultimate rights adjudicator machine has
evolved from the U.N.'s International Court of Justice (ICJ) (sometimes
referred to as the "World Court").5 Mostly, the assertion is that these two
already important world tribunals will fill the adjudicative vacuum created
by the globalization of society in general.
There are 18 international tribunals that are composed of permanent,
independent judges with authority to issue binding decisions on cases
5. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 285. In particular, they observe that the "Com-
mittee" is becoming increasingly court-like. Id. at 338, 344, 365. Even though Heifer and
Slaughter assert that the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) is a much more
important human rights body than many recognized, the UNHRC is not likely to assume the
role of adjudicator. Id. at 279.
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between two or more parties. 6 Some 96 bodies "in the international sys-
tem that are charged by States with the job of interpreting international
law" might also be seen as part of a global judicial regime.7 The U.S. par-
ticipates in a large number of such adjudicative mechanisms.8 Most of
these bodies are relatively new.9 Still, the WTO dispute settlement ma-
chinery and the ICJ seem most likely to gain some dominance among the
world's tribunals. Therefore, we can profitably reflect on a global legal
system radiating from these two adjudicative regimes.
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") established the WTO, embodied in the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization [hereinafter, the "WTO Agreement"].
GATT began in 1947, and has since served as framework for several
global free trade negotiations or "rounds." In its current iteration, the
WTO has considerable power. The WTO has already given evidence of its
potential for reviewing a wide range of national laws and practices.'0
McGinnis and Movsesian, for example, observed that, "The possibility of
covert protectionism thus necessarily forces the WTO to address envi-
ronmental, health, and safety issues."" They offer two models for the
future of WTO development: the anti-discrimination model and the regu-
latory model. The former is much less intrusive on national law than the
latter. The latter results in the WTO making global social policy regula-
tions to replace national regulations rejected as inconsistent with a world
market. These two pro-free trade commentators warned that: "[I]n light
of its academic and political support, the regulatory model will likely
compete with the antidiscrimination model in shaping the WTO of the
future."' 2 While both models presage significant shifts in sovereignty, the
"regulatory model" suggests a more aggressive imposition of a global
social policy on WTO member nations.
6. Shane Spelliscy, Note, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the
Armor, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 147 (2001).
7. Id. at 146.
8. Although debatable, U.S. participation, and hence, delegation of "judicial power,"
does not appear to violate the principals of the U.S. Constitution. Brian Havel, The Constitution
in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000) (arguing that suprana-
tional tribunals may, along with state courts and legislative courts, "share" in the exercise of the
Constitution's judicial power).
9. Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 148 ("Only two out of the eighteen have been in existence
for over thirty years and only four for more than twenty years... ").
10. "One of the WTO's more remarkable and controversial innovations is its mechanism
for resolving trade disputes among member states." Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compli-
ance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 777 (1999) (citing the massive literature that has already emerged).
11. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 511, 550 (2000).
12. Id. at 552.
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The growth of economic activity covered by supranational govern-
ment spurs corresponding growth in formal dispute resolution
procedures. 3 Originally, GATT made no provision for formal judicial
dispute resolution, but the Uruguay Round resulted in an agreement on
dispute settlement procedures.' 4 GATT provides that: "The WTO shall
administer the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ... in Annex 2 to this Agreement."" The WTO
provides for the resolution of disputes among member states in the "Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding" (DSU). DSU provides a panel of experts,
but not necessarily legal experts, to hear complaints from nations and de-
cide whether a member's laws violate GATT trade principles. 16 The
complaining party may seek compensation if the offending country fails
to implement the final decision. 7 The only sanction at present, however,
authorizes the unsatisfied complaining country to retaliate against the of-
fending party.
Parallel to trade, but moving more cautiously, is the global rights le-
gal culture and the judicial regimes supporting it. Several specialized
rights adjudicative bodies have developed over the years. 8 The general
human rights adjudicative institution, which has begun to evolve into a
global right enforcing body, is the International Court of Justice. The
ICJ's jurisdiction is very broad and it may be engaged to decide any types
of "disputes" as defined by the treaty. 9 Statehood is the only necessary
qualification to be a party.20 Although not necessarily confined to rights
cases, the ICJ is the prime candidate to become a comprehensive global
rights tribunal, and is most likely to evolve into a rights adjudicative
13. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitu-
tion: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
63 (1998); and Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Court and the National
Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary Reference, 1961-1995, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 66
(1998).
14. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 51-53 (2d ed. 1999).
15. One source of the WTO Agreement and related documents is the Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
16. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 6, 8, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226
(1994).
17. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 126 (2d ed. 1997).
18. E.g., The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1,
at 376.
19. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT,
1920-1996 519 (3d ed. 1997) ("[T]he classic definition of dispute is that given by the Perma-
nent Court... : 'A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or
of interests between two persons' ").
20. Id. at 605.
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regime.2 Clearly, it will and already has begun to develop a universal le-
gal culture for rights. 2
The ICJ has had a much longer history than the WTO, and has over
that time established principles supporting its judicial authority.23 Franck
identified the ICJ's early 90's decision in Libya's case against the U.S.
and the U.K. to block extradition of those responsible for the Lockerbie
airline bombing with Marbury v. Madison.24 The U.S. Supreme Court in
Marbury v. Madison laid claim to judicial review power in a manner that
prevented its claim from being resisted.5 Similarly, the ICJ established its
authority in the Lockerbie case to review the U.N. Security Council, al-
though it avoided direct confrontation with the U.N.'s political• • • 26
institutions. Lockerbie, like Marbury, however, is noteworthy for its as-
sertion of review authority, not its cleverness in avoiding direct
institutional confrontation.27
On December 21, 1988, a bomb planted on Pan Am flight 103 ex-
ploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two Libyan intelligence agents were
accused. The U.S. and the U.K. indicted these agents and requested ex-
tradition. Libya refused. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution
urging Libya to comply. Libya then instituted proceedings in the ICJ
against the U.S. and U.K. asking the Court to rule that it had complied
21. For example, the U.S. has agreed to over 70 multilateral treaties and 30 bilateral
treaties that contain special declarations of acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction without reserving the
right to refuse consent in a specific case. Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787, 789 (1998).
22. Criminal law is another area where an international legal culture may develop. For a
discussion of how civil and common law legal cultures may clash in the International Criminal
Court, see Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Impor-
tance of Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the
Formation of the International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L & FOREIGN AFF. 391
(2002). Christensen notes that elements of both civil and common-law procedures will be util-
ized in the ICC. Id. at 399.
23. Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World Court, 34
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
24. Thomas M. Franck, The "Power of Appreciation:" Who is the Ultimate Guardian of
UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992).
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury is well known to U.S. lawyers.
William Marbury was appointed justice of the peace by outgoing President John Adams. He did
not receive his commission before the new President, Thomas Jefferson, took office. At that
point his commission was rescinded and he sued James Madison, the new Secretary of State.
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, ruled that the Court did not have original
jurisdiction to provide the remedy requested, mandamus. In doing so, he asserted a very strong
sense of judicial review but, since he did not order the issuance of the commission, this assertion
could not be resisted. The foundation for strong judicial review was established but the actual
extent of the exercise of that authority has ebbed and flowed over the Court's history.
26. Concerning the Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114.
27. Franck, supra note 24, at 520. ("The similarities of the Libyan case to Marbury ex-
tend beyond judicial tactics").
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with the relevant international convention, that the U.S. and U.K. had
violated that convention and to order the U.S. and U.K. to desist threats
against Libya. Three days after the close of oral hearings, the Security
Council adopted a resolution ordering members to take coercive action
against Libya. The ICJ then ruled that Libya was not entitled to relief.
While several judges felt that the Security Council resolution was control-
ling, others asserted the power to review such resolutions under certain
circumstances." Watson summarized the totality of the case: "The deci-
sion implies that the international community is moving toward a broader
acceptance of judicial review than the framers of the U.N. Charter per-
haps envisioned-that subsequent practice under the Charter may have
altered its interpretation." 9
In addition to its constitutional significance, the Lockerbie case, like
Marbury, resolved questions of private, individual rights. In Marbury, the
plaintiff asserted his right to an office, whereas in Libya, the ICJ consid-
ered a right to protection from hostile criminal prosecution. The
Lockerbie case had the added constitutional dimension of establishing
judicial review of rights disputes among states. Clearly, the foundation for
serious judicial review authority in the ICJ has been set. Whether it will
be this adjudicative body, or some new one, it is inevitable that some hu-
man rights judicial regime will become prominent on the world stage.
In sum, it is easy to make the case that the DSB apparatus in trade
and the ICJ in rights will continue to evolve into dominant supranational
tribunals. It is equally likely that these two adjudicative systems will gen-
erate law increasingly affecting the world's population and impacting on
national legal cultures. More mature examples of similar developments,
however, are needed to conjure up a vision of the future of this global le-
gal culture.
B. The E.U. and U.S. Experiences as a Guide to the Future
of a Global Judicial Regime
To envision the evolution of a global legal culture, we turn to the
European and U.S. experiences. Both have developed adjudicative bodies
to further trade and human rights goals. U.S. courts have contributed to
the constitutional goal to "form a more perfect union." Europeans seek
"an ever-closer union," and have established adjudicative bodies that fur-
ther that goal.3° Both demonstrate how a cooperative enterprise can result
28. U.S. lawyers might relate this ruling to the "political question" limitations on judicial
review. See Vera Gowiland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Jus-
tice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643 (1994).
29. Watson, supra note 23, at 27.
30. The E.U. has always been understood as a work in progress, and its members have
agreed to "an ever closer union." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10,
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in unified trade and rights regimes.3' Both also demonstrate the symbiotic
relationship between the central legal authority and their constituent
states. The European and U.S. rights and trade adjudicative bodies then
offer some basis for predictions about the evolution of global rights and
trade regimes.
Like its European counterparts, the U.S. Supreme Court, along with
the lower federal courts, exercise power over both federal and state gov-
ernmental institutions. Article III vests "judicial power" in the Supreme
Court and potential "inferior courts. 32 Judicial power "shall extend to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties ... The U.S. Constitution unites judicial
power over the various rights and commerce powers. Hence, U.S. central
courts are different from European judicial bodies discussed below in that
they combine both trade and rights enforcement.
Movsesian notes the similarities between the emerging WTO dispute
settlement authority and the early years of the U.S. Supreme Court:
The history of Supreme Court review has interesting implications
for today's debate on the WTO. While there are significant dif-
ferences between the two institutions ... the Court and the WTO
are alike in one essential respect. Both are centralized tribunals
that purport to decide whether constituents' laws conform to ex-
ternal standards. And, just as the antebellum Court had to
establish its authority to determine whether state laws conformed
to federal norms, the WTO must establish its authority to deter-
mine whether national laws conform to international norms.
Indeed, ... the arguments made in today's debate on the WTO
greatly resemble those made earlier in the context of Supreme
34
Court review.
The U.S. has experienced a continuous tension between federalism
and nationalism, and between the courts and political institutions. Still,
the power of the federal courts in both rights and trade have grown since
1997, O.J. (C 340) pmbl. (1997). Recently, the German government proposed that the E.U.
adopt a true federal government much like its own, but the other members are not ready for
formalization of that degree of unification. The German state itself resulted from this type of
progression. The several Germanic entities began to coalesce in 1833 with the establishment of
the Zollerein, a German customs union. ANKE FRECKMANN & THOMAS WEGERICH, THE GER-
MAN LEGAL SYSTEM 19 (1999).
31. Mark Tushnet, Federalism and Liberalism, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 329
(1996) (observing a natural tendency toward centralization).
32. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
33. Id. at art. iI, § 2.
34. Movsesian, supra note 10, at 813 (citations omitted).
Fall 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
its founding and provide some justification for predicting similar tension
and evolution in world government.
Although U.S. lawyers have some 200 years of historical experience,
the recent E.U. experience might better serve to form an understanding of
centralization generated by supranational government." For some fifty
years, the E.U. has sought a "single market" in Europe.36 The European
experience predicts that the WTO trade regime and, more to the point, its
adjudicative institutions will only get stronger." The nominal goal of the
E.U. was economic cooperation, but the E.U. has become comprehen-
sive." The E.U.'s well-defined and aggressive legislative structure has
played a crucial role in centralization.3 9 But it is the role of judicial review
35. Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the CrossRoads of Legal Tradi-
tion, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 505 (1991) ("Personally, I am tempted to think that the Court of
Justice has become one of the major sources of legal innovation in Europe not only because of
its position as the Community's judicial institution, but also because of the intellectual strength
of its comparative methods").
36. The European Economic Community, known popularly as the "Common Market,"
was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. A second Treaty of Rome created the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), separated to accommodate the French. A previous treaty,
the European Coal and Steel Community, created the first of three communities, and was in
some senses the prototype. Together, these treaties created the three "communities" united in
1992 by the Treaty of European Union (Maastricht). This initial treaty has been amended on
occasion to form a constitution or "basic law." Each one of these iterations resulted in more
centralization of authority, memorialized by the name change to the "European Union." See
generally TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREA-
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter E.U. TREATY].
37. While member states such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom originally felt
resistant to give up a certain amount of sovereignty to the E.U., all now seem to have accepted
the superiority of E.U. law. See, e.g., Re: The Application of Wuinsche Handelsgessellschaft,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [federal constitutional court] 73, 339, 3 C.M.L.R. 225
(1987) (F.R.G.); Frontine v. Ministero delle Finanze, Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.] [highest
court for constitutional matters], 27 Dec. 1973, Foro It. 1974, I, 314, 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (1974)
(Italy); Regina v. Sec. of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1 Eng. Rep. 70 (H.L.
1990), 3 C.M.L.R. 375 (1990) (Eng.).
38. "Difficult as it may now be to believe, the founders of the Community appear to have
expected the Community institutions to intervene only in very specific ways in the Member
State economies." George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the Euro-
pean Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 355 (1994). The evolutionary
process from this narrow vision, now so "[d]ifficult ... to believe," to the E.U.'s robust and
broad authority, provides valuable insight into the forces at work in a global trade regime.
39. Article 4 establishes five institutions: the European Parliament, the Council, the
Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 4.
The first three are the political institutions. The allocation of authority among these three institu-
tions may be startling to U.S. lawyers unfamiliar with the E.U.'s legislative process, whereas it
may not seem extraordinary to those familiar with parliamentary governments. Some may be
surprised by the European parliament's passive role in the legislative process. The Commission,
which also administers the laws, has sole authority to initiate legislation, and the Council has
final enactment authority. These two institutions are constituted so as to represent the member
states. The Parliament, which is directly elected by E.U. citizens, has various types of review
and approval authority. In general, the Parliament has the power to stop, or at least make more
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of national or "member state" actions that provides the relevant experi-
ence for predicting the impact of global tribunals 0
The judicial authority of the E.U. is delegated to the European Court
of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has jurisdiction to enforce the basic law against
both E.U. institutions and member states.4' E.U. Treaty Article 220 pro-
vides simply: "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty the law is observed.' 42 The Court may void
an act of an E.U. institution under Article 231.43 More to the point here,
under E.U. Treaty Article 228, the Court may review actions by the
member states to determine if they have "failed to fulfil an obligation"
under the treaty." Both the treaties, as the basic laws, and the legislation
and regulations implementing them, may be enforced through member
difficult, the enactment of legislation. The Council, with the advice of the Commission, has the
final say. The latter two institutions may be comparable in a parliamentary system to the "gov-
emment" the leadership of the dominant party or parties, which controls legislation as well as
the executive, and hence Europeans may be more comfortable with this allocation of power.
Still, each major treaty has given Parliament more power in response to claims of a "democracy
deficit" and this trend is likely to continue.
40. For a description of the evolution of integration in the E.U., see Karen I. Alter, The
European Court's Political Power, 19 W. EUR. POL. 458 (1996). "The ECJ has become an im-
portant and influential actor in Europe and courts have become political actors in all sorts of
policy areas. Given that lower national judiciaries in Europe have historically played a much
less significant role in policy-making than they have in the United States, this transition is espe-
cially significant." Id. at 481.
41. The basic law does not contain a supremacy clause, as does the U.S. Constitution.
However, the E.U. Court, in an early display of its activism, recognized the supremacy of E.U.
law within its area of interest. Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), in 1964,
firmly established that principle and has not been seriously challenged.
The transfer, by member-States, from their national order, in favour of the Commu-
nity order of the rights and obligations arising from the Treaty, carries with it a clear
limitation of their sovereign right upon which a subsequent unilateral law, incompati-
ble with the aims of the Community, cannot prevail. As a consequence, Article 177
[reference from a national court to the E.U. Court] should be applied regardless of
any national law in those cases where a question of interpretation of the Treaty arises.
Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionate Per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585 [1964] 3 C.M.L.R.
425, 456 (1964). Currently, Article 10 (the former Article 5 as applied in Costa) provides that
"[miember States shall take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty and resulting from actions taken by the institutions of the Community."
E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 10. Further, its second paragraph states: "They shall abstain
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty." Id.
Combined with the Court's enforcement jurisdiction, it becomes quite easy for an activist court
to assert the supremacy of E.U. law, even without a supremacy clause as such.
42. Id. at art. 220.
43. Id. at art. 231.
44. Article 228 provides that a state must take necessary action to comply with the
Court's judgment and, if it fails to do so, the Court may impose a "penalty payment." Id. at art.
228.
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actions. However, E.U. laws may also have "direct effect," giving them
force in private litigation.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ has been extremely activist,
and the law it created in the E.U.'s formative stage forms the bedrock of a
strong central authority.46 Bermann summarized its role: "The Court of
Justice has thus taken virtually every opportunity that presented itself to
enhance the normative supremacy and effectiveness of Community law in
the national legal order.'47 Even though it has recently been more cau-
tious, as discussed below, legal doctrines it created are still a major
centralizing force in Europe.48 Alter found: "The European Union's legal
system has become the most effective international legal system in exis-
tence ....
The "Solange" series of cases involving conflict between the German
Constitutional Court and the ECJ demonstrates the natural movement to-
ward acceptance of supranational judicial power.50 The first case arose in
the late 1960s from a grievance involving a license application by an im-
port-export company, Internationale Handlelsgesellschaft. The German
administrative court referred the case to the ECJ on the question of
45. E.U. issues may be raised before national courts, and the national court may refer
such questions to the E.U. Court. The E.U. founders took the alternative approach to a "federal"
court system in contrast to the drafters of the U.S. Constitution. They created only one central
court, and largely relied on national courts. Moreover, unlike the U.S. federal system, the E.U.
Court may obtain a case directly from any national tribunal, from the highest national court to
the lowest, even tribunals outside the judicial system. Article 234 authorizes "preliminary rul-
ings" from "any court or tribunal of a member state" on treaty interpretations, validity of EU
acts, and interpretation of "statutes of bodies established" by the Council. E.U. TREATY, supra
note 36, art. 234.
46. Koopman, supra note 35, at 502 ("As the Court slowly started to act as the Commu-
nity's constitutional court, reviewing Community legislation and declaring national laws
incomparable with Community law, the most obvious model was the federal constitutional court
in Karlsruhe: France has no comparable tradition"); Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 13, at 19
("[Data] shows the range of discretionary power of the ECJ, that is, the set of policy outcomes
that it can sanction without its rulings being overturned by new legislation") (emphasis added).
Because civil law nations in Europe have traditionally been opposed to judicial activism, some
scholars might be surprised by the acceptance of the European Court of Justice. This acceptance
may be explained by the Court's essential role in European integration, a common goal of
member-states. Mark C. Miller, A Comparison of Two Evolving Courts: The Canadian Supreme
Court and the European Court of Justice, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 44 (1999). It
has also been noted that national judges in Europe approve of the Court's role because they see
it as a way to increase their own power. Id. at 46.
47. Bermann, supra note 38, at 353.
48. Koopman, supra note 35, at 495 ("Experience of the last thirty years shows that legal
integration is actually proceeding well, albeit at a slow pace.").
49. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 1 (2001).
50. Mark Killian Brewer, Note, The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for a Euro-
pean Constitution, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 555 (2001) (citing relevant cases and authorities).
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whether the E.U. regulation violated German "basic law."', The ECJ re-
sponded: "[T]he validity of a Community measure or its effect within a
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to
either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or
the principles of a national constitutional structure."52 It argued that even
violations of fundamental human rights protected by a national constitu-
tion cannot stand against E.U. law.53 The German Constitutional Court,
however, ruled that E.U. law could not take precedence over fundamental
rights guaranteed by Germany's basic law.-4 In the second Solange case in
1974, the German Constitutional Court softened its insistence on German
sovereignty in the face of E.U. law.55 Still, the German Court made it
clear that it retained the authority to determine whether E.U. law ade-
quately protected rights guaranteed by its constitution.56 In the third case,
based on the new Treaty for European Union, the German Court adopted
a new spirit of cooperation and moved closer to acceptance of a European
legal order.57
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) provides experience
in the evolution of supranational tribunals dealing with rights." The proc-
ess begins by an individual alleging a violation of their human rights
protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedom (Convention) 9 to a quasi-judicial tri-
bunal, the European Commission on Human Rights. If negotiations fail,
the Commission issues a decision determining whether the state party
violated the Convention. The ECHR reviews the evidence and legal ar-
guments de novo, and renders a final decision. 60 The ECHR acquires
51. Article 234 of the E.U. TREATY, supra note 15, (former Article 177) authorizes any
"court or tribunal of a member state" to request that the ECJ "give preliminary rulings" on in-
terpretations of E.U. law and on the validity of acts of E.U. institutions. Its purpose is to foster
cooperation between the national courts and the EC]. KOEN LENAERTS & KIRK ARTS, PROCE-
DURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 18-19 (Robert Bray ed., 1999). Indeed, it has made the
national courts active partners in the European law regime.
52. Case I 1/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1135 (1970).
53. Id. at 1133-39.
54. BERNARD RUDDEN, BASIC COMMUNITY CASES 68 (1987).
55. See JULIANE KOKOTT, REPORTING ON GERMANY, IN THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND
NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CON-
TEXT 89-90 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
56. Brewer, supra note 50, at 572.
57. However, true federalization of Europe is still a work in progress: "Solange III again
proved that the European Communities essentially remain an inter-governmental institution in
which the Member States retain ultimate control over the European Court of Justice." Id. at 574.
58. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 294.
59. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
60. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 193-266 (3d ed. 1998).
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jurisdiction if either the Commission or the defending state party appeals
(an individual may not appeal).6' States undertake in the treaty to abide by
the decision, but the legal effect they give the Court's judgment varies
considerably. The rate of compliance by states is nonetheless extremely
62high.
The ECHR's road to effectiveness should guide a global rights tribu-
nal. 63 The first factor that has increased its influence is the Court's
willingness to find for individual litigants against their state and its ability
to broadcast its performance in that regard. The second factor has been its
ability to mobilize its users and consumers, individuals and their lawyers,
voluntary associations and nongovernmental organizations.T 6 A third cru-
cial factor is demonstrable neutrality.
65
Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECHR and its member
states has made it somewhat less of a force than the ECJ. In recognition
of which, the ECJ has been required since the Amsterdam Treaty to apply
human rights standards as set out in the Convention to the E.U. institu-
tions and member states.66 The ECJ has not found itself bound by ECHR
decisions, but it refers to them in reaching its own rights-related judg-
67ments. In addition to ECHR rulings, the ECJ looks to the constitutions
and principles of the member states for human rights standards.68 In short,
the ECJ, despite its trade portfolio, has become an active rights enforcer.
Both the U.S. and the E.U. demonstrate the interaction between a
centralizing legal regimes and that of their constituent parts. These ex-
periences are instructive because the global judicial regime will force
national legal cultures to deal, with a complex matrix in which various
existing national and global legal principles interact. The ECJ has served
as a battleground for competing national laws of its member states. In AM
& S Europe v. Commission, a British company refused to provide certain
documents ordered by the Commission, citing legal privilege, an absolute
privilege under English common law.69 E.U. regulations involved in the
61. The Court notes, however, "that the Court should have knowledge of and, if need be,
take into consideration, the Applicant's point of view" Id. at 229-30.
62. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 296.
63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. at 312.
65. Heifer and Slaughter list several other factors that might contribute to empowering a
global rights court. Id. at 314-28.
66. Elizabeth F Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible
Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 19
DICK. J. INT'L L. 301, 306 (2001).
67. Case 2/94, Re: The Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights
Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1763, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
68. Defeis, supra note 66, at 317.
69. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities,
1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1579.
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Commission's order made no mention of legal professional privilege, but
it did provide detailed provisions on investigation procedures. When the
case came to the ECJ, British legal professionals gave support to the
company, while the French government, which was not otherwise in-
volved in the case, offered support to the Commission."' The French
government argued that a member state's criminal law principle could not
be extended into administrative law. After hearing multiple arguments, the
ECJ ultimately decided to recognize the principle of protection of confi-
dentiality. This is a clear example of the interaction of national laws in the
formation of a broadly applicable law developed by supranational judicial
bodies.
Slaughter observed both the "vertical" relations and "horizontal" rela-
tions among national and supranational courts .' That is, supranational
tribunals necessarily look to the law of its members, and whether the law
that the supranational tribunals devised, ultimately affected the law of its
members. The legal development moves "up" and "down" the suprana-
tional legal regime, as it has in both the U.S. and the E.U. In addition,
however, the practical legal interaction required by participation in a su-
pranational regime leads to borrowing and revision among national legal
cultures. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, "regarded by many foreign
judges and lawyers as resolutely parochial," has increasingly observed
72foreign principles. This supranational interaction introduces a new com-
plexity into national law.
Against the U.S. and E.U. experiences as a basis for forming a future
global legal culture is the undeniable fact that there is much greater diver-
sity among the world players, even just the substantial players, than faced
the U.S. goal of a "more perfect union" or the European goal of "an ever
closer union." The WTO encompasses a plethora of trade related legal
cultures. Perhaps even more daunting is the emotional and philosophical
70. Koopmans, supra note 35, at 498-99.
71. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1112 (2000) (leading to an emerging "judicial comity").
72. Id. at 1118 (led by Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist). The
acceptance of international law into U.S. domestic law is growing. Paust, supra note 21, at 791.
The acceptance of E.U. review principles into the English, i.e. common law, legal culture might
presage an increasing impact of globalization on U.S. national review law. The change in judi-
cial attitude in England attributed to the duty to enforce E.U. law is considered dramatic.
WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (7th ed. 1994). Conti-
nental review principles themselves are also finding their way into English law. See ROBERT
THOMAS, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000).
"[The pressure to apply E.U. law] may create an osmotic or 'spill-over' effect of European law,
whereby principles which need only be applied by the national court when it is concerned with
Community law may nevertheless filter through into the court's elaboration of domestic law." Id.
at 39. Whether borrowing is conscious or not, the general continental usage of the principle no
doubt provides legitimacy to arguments for its adoption in England.
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mdlange of rights thinking that face a global rights judicial regime.73 Re-
member, however, that Europeans came together within about a decade of
having been killing each other in record numbers with the two of the ma-
jor combatants forming the founding core. Nor are Europeans so
homogeneous.74 Religious and ethnic wars are a constant in European
history. Its legal cultures are far from homogeneous.75 The U.S. encom-
passes an even greater ethnic and cultural mix, although few of these can
claim dominance over any geographic or political unit, and it found uni-
fication an advantage in both trade and rights over time.
On the other hand, considerable commonality exists in the world, at
least, the legal world. While the world offers more diversity than either
the E.U. or the U.S., their experience predicts that unified judicial regimes
will generate a common legal culture in trade and rights.77 The experi-
ences in the U.S. and Europe provide some confidence that a global
judicial regime will be able to adjust in both trade and rights. A global
legal culture in both areas is possible, and judicial body or bodies will be
effective in confronting and evolving the necessary legal cultures. The key
will be identifying foundational principles acceptable to most member
nations and their citizens.
73. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 363.
74. Mark Killian Brewer, supra note 50, at 563-64 (asserting that Europeans are not a
cohesive group bound together by culture, language, or other factors).
75. Koopmans, supra note 35, at 493 (stating, while contrasting the relative cohesion of
the U.S. with Europe, that, "In the European Community, the legal systems of the Member
States are not only quite dissimilar, but some of them have even given origin to legal traditions
which belong to the great legal traditions of the world").
76. A global legal culture ultimately must fold in other legal cultures. At present, 1.2
billion Muslims seem particularly antagonistic to transatlantic culture in general. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR (2003). They are covered by Islamic law, "Sharia" in
some form, and for many it is the dominant or sole legal system. This antagonism might seem
an obvious counterexample to a commonality claim, but Bernard Lewis argued that the conflict
between Islam and the transatlantic society is not due to lack of common understanding. He
observed:
Islam and Christendom had a great shared inheritance, which drew on common
sources: the science and philosophy of Greece, the law and government of Rome, the
ethical monotheism of Judea, beyond all of them, the deeply rooted cultures of the
ancient Middle East .... True, they denounce each other as infidels, but in so doing,
they reveal their essential similarity, even kinship.
BERNARD LEWIS, CULTURES IN CONFLICT: CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND JEWS IN THE AGE OF
DISCOVERY 14-15 (1995). On the other hand, De Seif observed: "Great cultural differences exist
among various areas inhabited by Muslims .... The fact is that, despite this idealized concept
[of solidarity], relations between Muslims differs little from relations between Christians, as
shown by the internecine struggles ...... RODOLPHE J.A. DE SELF, THE SHAR'IA: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISLAM 6 (1994).
77. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 31 (2001)
(confirming convincingly that a culture might adopt the useful legal system of a historically
antagonistic culture by the fact that Israel adopted German civil law).
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C. Major Aspects of the E.U.-U.S. Impact
on a Global Legal Culture
As observed above, the global legal culture will be based on an
amalgam of the world's legal and governmental cultures. For the foresee-
able future, legal development will be dominated by U.S. concepts,
representing the common law world and the presidential government
model, and the E.U., representing the civil law tradition and the parlia-
mentary government system. This foundation is predictable not only
because these two transatlantic authorities, and the legal and governmen-
tal cultures they represent, will dominate at least this early stage, but
because these cultures have migrated around the world, forming in some
ways two fundamental models for legal and governmental institutions.
Combined, civil law and common law-based legal cultures cover over
70% of the world's population in over 62% of the jurisdictions. 7 1 Simi-
larly, most modern governments follow either the presidential or
parliamentary models, or some hybrid, and as will be discussed, these
governmental models will affect the emerging legal culture. In sum,
global legal culture will reflect a merger of civil and common law princi-
ples as transmuted in these two legal and governmental cultures.
E.U. legal principles, despite U.K. membership, are founded on the
civil law model. 79 As would be expected, it relied largely on the laws of
France and Germany. ° The precursor of German law was the Prussian
civil code, the first civil code ever established.' The original French code,
however, is considered the model for civil law systems." In short, E.U.
law is only one step removed from the bedrock of the civil law system
and, hence, represents that system on the world stage.
The civil law model has spread throughout the world and now covers
over half of the world's population." Its reception by other cultures is
well-documented. Generally, it has been a device, as it was in France, for
breaking with traditional law and government. However, it is not
78. University of Ottawa, supra note 3, at 3.
79. See MARTIN VRANKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW AND IMPACT OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 49 (1997).
80. See JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1992).
81. THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW
132-33 (1999) (explaining that while the Prussian code, sponsored by Frederick the Great, is
considered the first modem code, the code concept reaches back to Roman law); see also
JEAN-Louis HALPERIN, THE CIVIL CODE 2 (1996).
82. WATKIN, supra note 81, at 146 ("The codification of Napoleon has ... had the most
widespread impact upon the world at large"). Watkin also noted the influence of Germanic codi-
fications on the civil law tradition, as well. Id.
83. See also University of Ottawa, supra note 3. See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 109 (Tony Wier trans., 3d ed. 1998).
84. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 143.
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inherently revolutionary, and the German adoption, as discussed below,
actually sought to enshrine traditional laws.8 5 Each system that has
adopted the civil law model has added its own character. 6 Nonetheless,
the French version serves as the prototypical model.87 Its design had the
most influence on the E.U. treaties." For that reason, it is used here to
explore the global ramifications of an extension of the civil law model.
The common law model has been adopted around the world, in over a
quarter of the jurisdictions. This was less due to the result of a reform
movement, and probably more because once "the sun never set on the
British empire."8 9 As Glenn observed:
The common law expanded throughout much of the world as a
result of the British empire .... The result ... was a kind of
embedding of common law thinking in a large number of diverse
societies around the world .... What has happened, generally, is
the marriage of the idea of a common law with that of multiple
nation-states, and the marriage has been at times a difficult one.9O
Perhaps then, the formal adoption of the common law model signifi-
cantly understates the impact of common law thinking.
The E.U. and U.S. experiences also differ in the allocation of judicial
power over trade and rights. The two have followed divergent tracks con-
sistent with the U.S. and Continental European judicial structures. The
U.S. rights-enforcing judicial regime was combined with its
trade-unification regime, vested in the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts. Europe has a separate rights-enforcing judicial regime, the
ECHR, while the ECJ adjudicates trade issues. 9' The unification of the
trade and the rights judicial regimes within a single global tribunal is
clearly possible, but the European experience, at present, suggests an op-
posite outcome. The informal coordination between the European trade
adjudicator, the ECJ, and the European rights adjudicator, the ECHR, im-
plies that the two global judicial regimes will increasingly work in
tandem. At the very least, they will evolve an increasingly coordinated
85. Id.
86. See id. at 98-118.
87. However, in the particulars, the German version has been most often adopted because
it attempts detail, whereas the French code aims only at framework. Id. at 144-45, 147, 154.
88. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 49.
89. University of Ottawa, supra note 3.
90. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN
LAW 228-29 (2000).
91. In 1989, the Court of First Instance was established to take on some of the workload.
This Court has limited potential jurisdiction under Article 225, and even less actual jurisdiction
as it is currently empowered. The ECJ has appellate authority over the Court of First Instance,
and retains much of its original jurisdiction. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 225.
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global legal culture with both fundamental components. On the other
hand, U.S. lawyers are likely to at least instinctively favor unification,
because they are accustomed to a single federal court system handling
both. Our reflection does not require a clear commitment to either devel-
opment.
These two models, and the entire supranational legal enterprise, as-
sume a commitment to liberal democracy. Heifer and Slaughter argue
that, "The European experience of supranational adjudication is the ex-
perience of two supranational tribunals [the ECJ and ECHR] operating
within a community of liberal democracies with strong domestic com-
mitments to the rule of law."" They assert that a commitment to liberal
democracy is necessary for the commitment to (peaceful) supranational
adjudication. At this point, general global commitment to liberal democ-
racy seems plausible. Hence, that condition ought to be fulfilled.
The political models that form the foundation of liberal democracy
will also affect the development of a global judicial regime. Of course,
the E.U. and U.S. also represent the two dominant types of democratic
government: the parliamentary and presidential models. These two gov-
ernmental models incorporate the courts in quite different ways. That
difference will have to be "negotiated" in evolving a global judicial re-
gime. The overarching difference, with the most impact on the courts, is
the different sense of proper "separation of powers." The presidential
model separates the two political functions, legislative and executive, with
the judiciary acting as a coordinate branch. The parliamentary model
separates the judiciary from the unified political functions. The U.S. gov-
ernment, of course, is presidential. The E.U. combines parliamentary
governments, so that its instincts and its citizens' understanding of gov-
ernment begin with the parliamentary model and its vision of the courts.93
The separation of the judiciary from social policy decisions in parliamen-
tary government reinforces a similar civil law philosophy. As will be
discussed, the judicial role in government in the presidential system, as
opposed to the parliamentary system, will be a source of ideological more
than structural tension in the global regime.
92. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 331.
93. However, the E.U. may embody more of a presidential-model sense of separation of
powers. Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A
Callfor Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451, 468-69 (1999) ("Meth-
ods of holding administration accountable in parliamentary systems offer little guidance for the
Community. In Brussels, unlike national systems, the legislative principle is divided.... United
States institutions can contribute to the Community administrative reform debate because in the
United States as well a divided lawmaking principal must hold the administration accountable.")
(emphasis added).
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The E.U. and the U.S. are constantly dealing with the tension be-
tween nationalism and centralization. Alter summed up the evolution of
the European shift in sovereignty:
The transformation of the European legal system is no longer
seen as controversial. The incredible success of the ECJ makes it
hard to imagine a European Union where European law is not
supreme over national law. But ... member states intended to
create a limited legal system so as to protect national sover-
eignty.94
Still, the E.U., despite pressure for an ever-closer union, has not been
immune from the devolution movement. The E.U. has embodied its no-
tion of this conflict in the doctrine of "subsidiarity." The doctrine of
subsidiarity expresses a growing sense that the E.U. was detracting from
members' authority beyond that intended or wished by its members and
their citizens." In short, it expresses a preference for social policy deci-
sion-making at the level closest to those who will be affected while still
achieving the desired shared goal. Article 5 now expressly provides that:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore.., be better achieved by the Community.
96
The E.U. "federalism" controversy is very familiar to U.S. lawyers.
In U.S. constitutional law, the two sides in this debate are represented by
the "nationalist," advocating a strong federal authority, and "federalist,"
supporting a considerable retention of authority by the states.97 This con-
94. ALTER, supra note 49, at 183.
95. The doctrine began to emerge in the early 1980's from several different venues. The
1992 "Maastricht Treaty," formally the Treaty on European Union (TEU), incorporated the
concept into basic law. For a discussion of the Amsterdam Treaty's treatment of subsidiarity and
the experience with that principle between the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty, see Christian
Timmermans, Subsidiarity and Transparency, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 106, 127 (1999) (con-
cluding that "Judge Pescatore ... feared that subsidiarity would set us back into the dark times
of anarchy of the nation states. I am happy to say now in 1998 that after five years of subsidiar-
ity, the Community is still very much alive").
96. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 5.
97. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141 (1988).
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flict has raged since the Constitutional Convention. 9 As in the E.U., uni-
fication and localism ebb and flow. 99
U.S. federalism and E.U. subsidiarity contrast in interesting ways that
might shape any predictions about the future of shared authority between
the global regime and its national members. Bermann distinguished the
two concepts in this way: "U.S. federalism places greater emphasis on the
presence of an overall balance of power between the federal government
and the states than on respect for any single rule for allocating compe-
tences among the different levels of government."'t ° U.S. federalism
principles may look to an array of justifications for centralized deci-
sion-making in a particular area of public policy. The federal government
may decide that a solution should be sought at the national level without
having to formally justify that choice. Subsidiarity focuses only on "the
relative capacities of federal and state government to deal effectively or
adequately with the problem or policy at hand."'0 ' Subsidiarity is a formal
restraint in which the central government may take action only if it can
demonstrate that it is the best actor; otherwise, the solution to a perceived
problem must be left to the local authority. Therefore, E.U. subsidiarity
places the burden on the E.U. institutions, including the E.U. Court, to
demonstrate that centralization is superior, whereas U.S. federalism al-
lows the political institutions to make the choice. E.U. subsidiarity then
both empowers a reviewing court to restrain central authority and re-
strains the central adjudicative bodies from themselves asserting power.
U.S. federalism inhibits judicial interference in centralization of a solu-
tion, but only if it attempts to circumvent legitimate political judgments.
All of these E.U.-U.S. governmental experiences assist in developing
a framework for envisioning the future of a global legal culture. They
show the process toward some degree of centralization, and the legal rela-
tionships between central authorities and their sovereign units. They show
the role likely played by the adjudicating tribunals of the central authority,
and the tensions that role creates. These sources help us envision similar
evolution in global government and the role of global tribunals. We move
then to laying the foundation for contemplating that future.
98. See generally JAMES E SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN
MARSHALL, AND THE EPic STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002).
99. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has tipped the law towards regionalism. See, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fed. Mar Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
100. Bermann, supra note 38, at 450.
101. Id. at 451.
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II. CIVIL LAW THINKING IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
This Part has two interrelated goals. First, I expect that most of the
readers of this work will have only limited knowledge of basic civil law
principles. Thus, this section tries to provide an overview of civil law
thinking. Second, in order to do so in a way that moves the inquiry for-
ward, it also attempts to identify some major issues that might arise as
those concepts are incorporate into a global legal culture. These observa-
tions anticipate the discussion in Part III, in which the civil law meets
common law thinking on the world's legal stage. While a common law
scholar might seem a curious person to attempt these objectives, I might
claim both an advantage in explaining civil law concepts to common law
readers and in anticipating outsiders' reaction to those concepts as they
might be brought forward into the global arena.
A. The Concept of a "Code"
It is well recognized that the keystone of the civil law system is "the
code." The concept of the code, however, is much more ideological than
common lawyers recognize. In approaching the civil law, common law-
yers must dismiss the popular distinction that civil law is statutory law as
opposed to judge-made common law. As Merryman in his famous guide
to the civil law for U.S. lawyers wrote:
The distinction between legislative and judicial production of law can
be misleading. There is probably at least as much legislation in force in a
typical American state as there is in a typical European or Latin American
nation .... The authority of legislation [in the U.S.] is superior to that of
judicial decisions; statutes supersede contrary judicial decisions (constitu-
tional questions aside), but not vice versa .... If, however, one thinks of
codification not as a form but as the expression of an ideology, and if one
tries to understand that ideology and why it achieves expression in code
form, then one can see how it makes sense to talk about codes .... 02
The first step, then, is to explore the ideology expressed by the code
oriented strategy.
The need for this understanding is particularly acute because suprana-
tional legal principles will necessarily evolve from multinational
agreements. Civil lawyers will approach both the drafting and interpreta-
tion of those basic agreements as they might a code.0 3 The E.U. treaties
102. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-27 (2d ed. 1985).
103. There may also be added pressure for more code-like legislation in the common law
Member States of organizations such as the E.U. For example, there has been a great deal of
debate over the possibility of criminal and commercial codes in England, though many English
legal scholars are opposed to such ideas. See Lord Goff of Chieveley, The Future of the Corn-
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support this conclusion.'0 Vranken notes that, "Similarities exist between
the 1957 Treaty of Rome ... and the 19th century codes, in particular the
French Code Civil. The Treaty is a framework treaty (traitg cadre): it lays
down a grand design only. Yet somehow the treaty can make the same
claim to comprehensiveness as a civil code."' '5 This similarity is far from
a surprise because civil law drafters instinctively conceived of their mis-
sion as creating a European code. More to the point, one can expect civil
lawyers to seek to fashion global agreements with the same instincts, and
they will view the final product as if it were a code. What does this mean?
1. Objective in Resort to a Code System
The civil law ideology grew out of an experience that taught that
courts might be the most dangerous branch, and certainly not inherently
the least dangerous.' °6 This principle belief began with the French ancien
regime, in which the "Parlements," or regional courts, were oppressive
and corrupt instruments of bourgeois authority, and frequently served as
an instrument for royal repression. 0 7 Constraining judicial abuses was the
goal of the code, and that goal pervades through civil law thinking. It is
how the courts are constrained, however, that is the key to understanding
the civil law ideology.
Because of this experience, the separation of powers between majori-
tarian government, the legislative process, and the judicial function is a
fundamental objective of the code.' 8 While recognizing three functions,
law making, law implementing, and law interpreting, it strives to insulate
the legislative (law making) function from the judicial. '°9 This govern-
mental objective conforms to the parliamentary model in which civil law
systems reside. That model combines the executive and legislative in that
mon Law, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 745, 750 (1997) ("Since English commercial law seems to be
so widely used and English commercial lawyers seem to be so widely consulted, why worry
about a commercial code?").
104. The current iteration of the E.U. treaties is at least as much constitutional in nature.
Indeed, the E.U. treaties are now generally considered a de facto constitution. Brewer, supra
note 50, at 559 n.21. Also, E.U. members are committed to developing an actual constitution in
the near future. The Laeken European Council, Laeken Declaration-The Future of the Euro-
pean Union, Dec. 15, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/
doc151201--en.htm. Still, they retain a code-like nature as well.
105. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 49.
106. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 431 (1968).
107. ANDREW WEST ET. AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 142 (2d ed. 1998) ("The Re-
public has traditionally been wary of the power of the judiciary. This distrust is rooted in the
way the Parlements of the Ancien Rggime abused their position and interfered in politics.").
108. Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 48 TUL.
L. REV. 1010, 1012 (1974) ("The courts, however, may not make law. This prohibition stems
from the doctrine of separation of powers...").
109. RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 8 (1998).
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the legislative branch forms the executive leadership and is ultimately
controlled by it. Thus, both the civil law model and the parliamentary
model seek protection of democratic law making and implementing func-
tions from an elite judiciary.
In their seminal comparative law explanation, David and Brierley at-
tribute this division in some degree to all the systems in the entire
"Romano-Germanic family." The tendency is both traditional and natural:
Given the present unfailing tendency of jurists in all countries to
look for support in a text of law, the creative role of judicial deci-
sions is always, or nearly always, hidden behind the screen of an
'interpretation' of legislation. It is exceptional for jurists to aban-
don this habit or for judges to admit frankly that they have the
power of creating rules. They persist in their attitude of obedience
to enacted law, even when the legislature itself has recognized
that they may be gaps in the legislation ....
Whatever the contribution of the courts to the evolution of the
law, it certainly differs, therefore, from that of the legislators in
countries of the Romano-Germanic family. Legislators, who
nowadays are called upon to establish the framework of the legal
order, do so by formulating commands and creating rules of law.
Very rarely are courts authorised to use this method .... save a
few possible exceptions which, while undoubtedly interesting,
leave the principle intact nevertheless."
Thus, the civil law actors adhere to this separation of functions, but
the impact on the legal culture is subtle.
This parliamentary, civil law vision of separation of powers is likely
to guide the global judiciary. First, civil law nations dominate the global
arena, and civil law public law principles do not seem to give way to
common law principles."' Second, most nations have some form of par-
liamentary system with a strong legislative concept. Third, and perhaps
more important, the global participants will not trust an activist and free
wheeling judiciary.
Interestingly, despite the fact that most E.U. members have a civil law
legal culture, and all have a parliamentary form of government (although
some have a "hybrid"), the ECJ has been quite activist. Yet, it is unlikely
110. REN9 DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD To-
DAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW 123 (2d ed. 1978).
111. In hybrid systems, public law is where the mix happens. PALMER, supra note 77, at
9-10 ("One searches in vain for a system where continental law predominates in the public
sphere while Anglo-American law dominates the private.").
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that such activism will be acceptable on the global stage. The WTO Ap-
pellate Body's decision in EC-Measures Affecting Livestock and Meat
Products (Hormones),' 2 illustrates this concern. In EC-Hormones, the
Appellate Body admonished the Panel for imposing procedures on the
parties that did not have a foundation in the treaty's text. It was very con-
cerned over the Panel's lack of respect for an agreement that WTO
Members consented to as a framework for guidance. Thus, the tradition of
civil law coupled with the tendency of global institutions to reject judicial
activism indicates the separation of legislative and judicial functions will
likely persist into any global legal system.
2. Natural Law
The place of natural law is historically significant, and hence is im-
portant in understanding the instincts of civil law philosophy. Zweigert
and Kotz explained it as such:
As a matter of intellectual history it is clear that the Code as
whole would never have existed but for the idea of codification
which comes from natural law. Furthermore the [French] Code
Civil is based on the tenet of natural law that there are autono-
mous principles of nature, quite independent of religious belief,
from which one can infer a system of legal rules which, if given
intelligible form according to a plan, can act as the basis for an
orderly, reasonable, and moral life in society."3
Thus, civil law is founded on what is called "secular natural law."
' 4
Understanding the civil law ideology requires the recognition that
somewhere in at least the subconscious of the civil law is the ghost of
natural law. Yet, modern jurisprudence worldwide has much less respect
for the concept of natural law, even as a legitimate evolutionary root.
Even civilians have questioned the propriety of founding a legal system in
the notion of natural law, although perhaps they cannot totally distance
themselves from some visceral imperative.' Nonetheless, whatever they
now believe about universal principles, civil law is imbued with natural
law reasoning.
The civil law's natural law orientation will affect its impact on the
global stage, where other cultures will cling to their own set of universal
112. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, DSR 1998:1 135, 181 (Feb. 13,
1998).
113. ZWEIGERT & KoTZ, supra note 83, at 88.
114. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 18-19.
115. See WATKIN, supra note 81, at 139.
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principles.' 6 It will be hard to negotiate these differences in global tribu-
nals because they are based on cultural experience and tradition. Thus, the
more civilians seem attached to a natural law the more controversy will
revolve around fundamental principles. It is well accepted that negotiation
is most likely to breakdown when fundamental principles are at stake. In
short, disagreement over the very existence of natural law can be expected
to be one source of tension if the civil law model is adopted on a global
level.
Indeed, even the notion of legal secularism will be questioned in
many legal cultures. What is known as the jus commune, the sources of
civil law, includes canon, i.e. catholic, law along with Roman and local
law.' '7 Although to a large extent the code approach was intended to free
the legal culture from religious principles, the resulting code was imbued
with them. It will be important for participants to recognize the potential
religious undertones of any disagreements between applying the princi-
ples of civil law and other legal cultures.
3. Rationalizing the Law
The philosophical context from which the civil code emerges justified
a scientific approach to law making and development. Indeed, Merryman
observed that, "[Civil law scholars] deliberately and conscientiously
sought to emulate natural scientists.""' The codes are the product of the
"Age of Reason." "The civil codes are premised on the belief that life is
not full of random events, but rather that there is order."" 9 Therefore, the
civil law instinctively perceives the law as a subject of scientific study and
formulation.12 Starting with that conception of the law, it seemed quite
reasonable that a small body of experts, called "jurists," should lay the
foundation of the legal culture.'
2'
A substantial difference exists, however, between the French ap-
proach and the German approach.122 The French code was revolutionary in
that it sought to wipe away prior law and establish a new legal order; in
contrast, the German code sought to adopt fundamental principles by sci-
entific study of the historical context of existing German law. The French
code writers thus set out to discover, though science, a set of 'best princi-
116. Indeed, U.S. law incorporates natural law principles, such as the rights of man, as
much as we would like to deny it. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 16-17.
117. Id. at 11-12.
118. Id. at62.
119. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 35.
120. F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 76 (1955).
121. "Jurist" means an "academic lawyer." VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 44 ("Both the
French and German civil codes were the product of a small team of people.").
122. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 28-33.
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ples,' whereas the German "historical school" opposed a code devised by
reasoning due to philosophical principles. Nonetheless, the two civil law
models share a desire for rationality and a scientific approach to the law.
Just as it is not fruitful today to assert universal principles of law, the
world may also be skeptical of a neutral, scientific approach to its legal
system.'23 First, agreement on best principles is extremely difficult. While
the search might be for some sort of principled consensus, that consensus
will result from a "negotiation" of legal traditions, rather than a scientific
distillation of immutable axioms. Second, much of the science in the civil
law system was historical, the derivation of law from ancient "wise"
cultures. History and social traditions are not universal, and other,
non-transatlantic societies will look to their own "wise" cultures.
Moreover, the "wise" cultures have lost much of their gloss, particularly
the ones upon which the code is founded.
Still, the objective rationality of civil law may find acceptance in the
global legal culture. Legal consensus cannot be developed from a "town
meeting," even of representatives of legal cultures. Rather, the global
"legislation" will necessarily be the work of a body of persons charged
with developing its framework. Many of these individuals will be jurists,
instinctively trying to find and incorporate the "best" ideas. The structured
adaptation and creativity of the civil law system may be compatible with
the evolution of the law in the global arena.
4. A Code is a Framework
Whatever its philosophical roots may be, the overarching strategy of
any code is to create a framework for society. The framework seeks the
smallest possible number of elements; it seeks what the civil law jurist
Jhering called an "economy of juristic concepts.' 24 The degree to which
this strategy is adhered to varies among codes. Nonetheless, the object of
any code is to provide this foundational framework for the legal culture.'25
It is a launching pad from which judicial decisions and legislation spring.• 26
It seeks at once to be concise, straightforward, and universal.
Given the philosophical difference, it is not surprising that the French
and German code differ in this respect. The French code was to be so
123. For an English perspective, see Goff, supra note 103, at 760 ("Let us therefore con-
tinue to worship at the shrine of the working hypothesis, and continue too to contemplate the
great idea with all the caution bred of common sense and our long experience.").
124. LAwSON, supra note 120, at 67.
125. For a common law perspective, see Goff, supra note 103, at 753 ("Continental law-
yers love to proclaim some great principle, and then knock it into shape afterwards. Instead the
boring British want to find out first whether and, if so, how these great ideas are going to work
in practice.").
126. See LAwsON, supra note 118, at 79; see also VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 58.
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simple and straightforward that lawyers would be unnecessary. In con-
trast, its precursor, the Prussian Ladrecht of 1794, attempted to be so
detailed as to govern every possible situation. Even after the failure of this
attempt, the drafters of the German code sought a much more detailed and
technical document. Its code strategy incorporated a role for legal profes-
sionals. Still, the two code models aim at a framework around which the
total legal system could be built.
5. Symbol of Change and Unity
Despite their different philosophies, the German and French models
share fundamental code-related goals that have popularized them around
the world."' They incorporate a sharp separation of powers doctrine in
which the legislature makes the law and judges are prevented from doing
so. Thus, codes represent an affirmation of majoritarian government.
Also, since they are necessarily the product of nationalism, creating one
law for an entire nation, codes performed (and continue to perform) a
unifying function. It may be these characteristics that recommend the civil
model to emerging states around the world. For these people, the code
offers tangible commitment to democratic government, rather than gov-
ernment run by elites, and the expression of nationhood.
These characteristics make civil law ideology particularly attractive to
the global legal culture. Globalization will instinctively drive toward uni-
fication, and a code is an effective technique for centralization. The
code-like use of the treaties forming the E.U. demonstrates this unifying
nature. 121 Multinational agreements resembling a generalized, or
French-style, code, will no doubt play the role of the "code" in a more
global context. 
29
6. Anticipated Interpretative Method as a Guide to Drafting
The civil law system has developed sophisticated interpretative
methods, and the anticipation of application of these techniques will af-
fect the drafting instincts of civil law system participants. For one thing,
the civilian approach to language is consistent with the general interna-
tional law commitment to text. " " The WTO Appellate Body decision in
127. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 32.
128. The E.U. treaties' ambiguous nature has generated a call for the creation of an actual
European code. Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1 (2002).
129. The founding treaties of supranational organizations naturally take on the character-
istics of a code. Undeniably, these agreements also have constitutional aspects. See Movsesian,
supra note 10. A code is considered much more operational than a constitution. Nonetheless, as
discussed below, constitutional interpretation and code interpretation have much in common.
130. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
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India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products demonstrates this instinct.'3 In India-Quantitative
Restrictions, the Appellate Body expends much effort in interpreting the
correct meaning of "thereupon." This illustrates the supranational organi-
zation's concern with remaining bound to the treaty text, as reflected in
their judiciary's decisions. Thus, civil law participants, at least, will em-
bellish any global agreements and implementing multinational
governments in much the same way as the codes have been embellished.
The civil law incorporates a hierarchy of legislation. In civil law
countries, there are both code provisions and statutes, and each has its
own style. 132 Statutes tend to cover very specific subjects, and are drafted
very specifically. Merryman describes these "microsystems" that revolve
around the Code. 33 These microsystems are created by decidedly political
legislative action, not the work of an impartial team of legal experts.
Within the microsystem are the executive actions and decrees. Such ad-
ministrative actions are important to the implementation of a code
framework.'34 The code provisions tend to be more general in nature, and
more stable than these embellishments. "Thus new legislation should em-
ploy the concepts and institutions and follow the organization established
by the scholars and embodied in earlier systematic legislation."'33
A civilian will work with global legislation as frameworks in the na-
ture of a code. Even among civil law nations, however, the same
provision has been given different meaning, evidencing, even among sys-
tems that show initial agreement, the pull of forces such as customary law
and national experience.3 6 Thus, it is important to remember that civilians
will bring to the global arena, not agreement on specifics, but a common
legal philosophy, an ideology that will deeply affect the global legal cul-
ture. Civil law-trained global judges may resist efforts to use sources
other than the language of agreements to establish general principles.
They may accept reference to other sources, including other judicial
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention: Treaties]. But the Convention also allows modification by "subsequent practice." Id. at
art. 31(3)(b).
131. See generally WTO Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR
1999:IV 1763, 1766-69,$$ 11-24 (Sept. 22, 1999).
132. The statutes represent the influence of common law countries, particularly the United
States, on modem civil law countries.
133. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 151-52.
134. See id. at 154-55. The overshadowing of legislative policymaking by administrative
action in modem society seems to be universally lamented but inevitable.
135. Id. at 81.
136. Id. at 142 (variety in rules).
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opinions, but that acceptance must be carefully understood in the civil law
context.
In a code system, judicial interpretations are overshadowed by the
interpretations of the scholars and academic lawyers called "jurists."
Scholars are a crucial source of interpretation.' Lawson stated bluntly
that, "Civil law is inconceivable without the jurist."' 3 8 Civilians will
naturally assume that teams of experts will draft any global legal
framework, and they will expect jurists to contribute significantly to
future interpretation of that framework. "' However, global judges
themselves will rarely reflect the civil law model, and the civil law's
reliance on academic decision makers will be met by resistance among
world participants. The extent to which learned individuals receive
deference will be a point of tension.
B. Legal Dynamics in the Civil Law System
A perception of the civil law system is that code interpretation is pro-
hibited, or at least closely constrained. True, at first, the French code
drafting project thought to prohibit judicial interpretation and leave the
legislature, as the democratic institution, to be the sole authority to evolve
law from the code. But change and interpretation are inevitable, and code
aficionados have no illusions that it could be otherwise. 14 0 Napoleon,
himself, lamented shortly after the Code Civil came into effect: "The
Code had hardly appeared when it was followed almost immediately, and
as a supplement, by commentaries, explanations, developments, interpre-
tations, and what not ... Indeed, the original French code itself
recognized the need for interpretation. 42 "Consequently there is general
agreement in civil law jurisdictions that judges do have the power to in-
terpret evolutively." 141 Still, as Zweigert and Puttfarken observed,
"Conspicuously lacking in civil law jurisprudence is a methodology of the
judicial development of the law, a methodology which would analyze,
137. Id. at 66.
138. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 69.
139. Two examples of this instinct translated into a supranational regime are the European
Convention on Human Rights, VAN DIJK, supra note 60 (noting that once the decision to pro-
ceed was made, the participants appointed a "Committee of Government Experts.") and
Belgium's efforts to empower the ICJ, Watson, supra note 23, at 11-12.
140. HALPERIN, supra note 81, at 15 ("The Code's redactors were.., persuaded that such
detail must remain the work of judges and commentators (jurisconsultes), and left a wide berth
for judicial interpretation. Of course, article 5 of the Code forbids judicial decisions that aspire
to legislative character (arrets de reglements).").
141. C.J. Friedrich, The Ideological and Philosophical Background, in THE CODE NAPO-
LEON AND THE COMMON LAW-WORLD 15-16 (Bemard Schwartz ed., 1954).
142. ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 83, at 89-90.
143. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 46.
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rationalize, and systematize the specific role of the judge in the process of
finding and making law."'" The nature of the interpretative and evolution-
ary process serves as one of the premiere distinguishing characteristics of
a code system.
It starts with a literal or structured approach. This expresses an at-
mosphere or attitude: a real commitment to language, often called a
"grammatical" approach. 45 The courts pay more than lip service to the
idea that if the language is clear, they must apply that language. Even
when the statute is ambiguous, a judge must stick to the statute. Of
course, the language does not often compel an outcome. Indeed, a code
based upon the French system, particularly, is rarely so specific. Under
those circumstances, the court is to engage in "logical interpretation." De
Cruz described the approach in this way: "If application of the grammati-
cal meaning approach suggests more than one possible interpretation, the
text may be construed in accordance with the 'logical interpretation' ap-
proach." 46 Applying the logical interpretation approach, a judge may
construe the legislative provision not just on its stated terms, but with the
context of the entire body of rules comprising the legal system, derived
from the same statute, in other laws or from recognized general principles
of law.
47
The overarching goal of the civil law system is legal certainty. 48 In a
way, the German system serves this goal better because its code is more
precise than the French code. Yet the French system may be moving in
that direction. " 9 The balance between predictability and the process of
change in the civil law system is important to understanding the operation
of that system.
Certainty is guaranteed by the use of clear concepts. Clear concepts
and principles provide elements of innumerable combinations designed to
fit any particular situation.'"0 The concepts move decision making ahead
144. Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jirgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style,
44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 715 (1970) ("From a common law point of view this must be the most
astounding feature of civil law.").
145. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 267 (2d ed. 1999).
However, "[i]f the text is unequivocal and can have only one meaning, but applying it would
lead to absurdity or repugnance, both common law and civil law courts will disregard a statute's
grammatical construction or plain meaning." Id. at 268.
146. Id.
147. See generally Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Com-
parative Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 689 (1998).
148. See VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 37 ("For the drafters of the French Code civil a
direct relationship existed between their desire for legal certainty and the need to produce a
comprehensive text.").
149. Id. at 60.
150. See LAWSON, supra note 120, at 66.
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as in chess, according to clear and definite rules.'5 ' Civil law aims for sta-
bility of the platform or framework, but not total prohibition of change.
As Merryman observed: "[Certainty] is an abstract legal value. Like a
queen in chess, it can move in any direction."'
5 2
The drive for certainty emphasizes systemic values, which concen-
trate on definitions and classifications. Categorization may be seen as a
kind of applied formalism.'5 But unlike an extreme formalism which ul-
timately generates strict rules, categorization disciplines without
inhibiting development. Indeed, categorization can be extremely crea-
tive. 11 Developing the law to serve society is an important aspect of the
civil law system, more important in theory than individual justice.' 55 It
attempts, however, to direct the mental process by which one evaluates or
evolves ideas, and its mental discipline has a natural tendency towards
ordering.
Categorization structures experience and experimentation. The
French jurist Tunc sought to explain this aspect of the civil law system:
If there is a sentence which a French lawyer has great difficulty in
understanding, it is Holmes' famous saying: 'The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.' It is questionable
whether the opposition between logic and experience has any jus-
tification. Exact sciences are equally based on experience and on
logic.
5 6
Indeed, categorization demands the reworking of classification with
each new "sample" dispute resolution, which adds to the experience of
law. Categorization recognizes that theory without application is empty
and that application without order creates systemic chaos. Experience and
theory are necessary partners in any progressive evolution of both practice
and ideas. The categorization process does not slowly withdraw issues
from reality as the rules become more wooden with use, a circumstance
one might see with formalism. '17 Rather, categorization orders a creative
decision-making process.
151. Id.
152. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 48.
153. "'Formalism' describes legal theories that stress the importance of rationally uncon-
troversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly particular rules or quite abstract
principles." Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983).
154. STEVEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF
HISTORY 98 (1989) (implying that taxonomy can lead to very creative scientific development).
155. See LAWSON, supra note 120, at 85.
156. Andre Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459, 468
(1976).
157. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 1001 (1987) ("A nonbalancing approach ... does not require a court to be blind to the
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Categorization is dynamic as well as creative. It is quite useful for
adapting to new circumstances and new social problems. U.S. jurist Dun-
can Kennedy described the reciprocal nature of its developmental
strategy, whereby practice influences the system of premises and the sys-
tem of premises influences practice.'58 As to its operational strategy, he
explained that, "The basic mode of this influence of theory on results is
that the ordering of myriad practices into a systematization occurs
through simplifying and generalizing categories, abstractions that become
the tools available when the practitioner (judge or advocate) approaches a
new problem."5 9 Categorization is a decisional tool that can incorporate
all relevant values in the face of new circumstances. The dynamic and
adaptive, yet necessarily applied, nature of categorization form out of the
bounded creativity of the civil law model.
The subtlety of this stable but dynamic approach to language may
baffle non-civil lawyers on the global stage.' 60 Civil law participants in
the global arena will seek to create and perceive the language as creating
concepts. In individual application, they will expect the concepts in inter-
national agreements to remain constant, applied in a principled way
dictated by that language. 6 Thus, tension over the manipulation of lan-
guage, not disagreement over its flexibility, is likely between civilians and
non--civilians.
consequences of constitutional rules or the social context in which constitutional rule or the
social context in which constitutional questions arise.").
158. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. LAw & Soc. 3, 8 (1980)
("[Classical legal thought] is designed to tell us about the theoretical atmosphere within which
practices occurred, and to tell us about the manner in which the theoretical atmosphere influ-
enced particular results.").
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. In an early case where English courts had to interpret and apply European Commu-
nity regulations, Lord Denning described the problems English judges face:
What a task is thus set before us! The Treaty is quite unlike any of the enact-
ments to which we have become accustomed. The draftsmen of our statutes have
striven to express themselves with the utmost exactness .... They have sacrificed
style and simplicity ....
How different is this treaty. It lays down general principles. It expresses its aims
and purposes .... But it lacks precision .... An English lawyer would look for an
interpretation clause, but he would look in vain.
Bulmer Ltd. v. Bollinger S.A., All. Eng. Rep. 1226, 1237 (1974).
161. Indeed, Palmer found that civilians may prefer the common law approach because it
shows the adoption of common law principles. PALMER, supra note 77, at 46 ("Stare decisis
may seem to be a needed check on judicial activism and provide safeguards against future ero-
sion [of the civil law character].").
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Civilians refer to the "teleological approach," interpretation according
to adaptations of rapidly changing social or economic conditions. 162 The
theory is that every code provision is considered a thread in one whole
cloth. The significance of this strategy is that where there is an ambiguity
in a code provision, the first place one looks is at other code provisions.
Thus, judges in the civil law tradition can sometimes "read into" a code
provision something, which is taken from another provision, which might,
on its face, not seem terribly relevant. The result may not, however, be
directly contrary to a conclusion derived directly from a grammatical or
logical interpretation. It does not preclude contradiction by reference to
legislative history, but original intent and legislative history are considered
only after there is a determination that no answer can be found in the
code. As Kotz explained: "As regards the civil law, it is an overstatement
to say that a code is always completely self-contained and therefore
excludes all reference to any source of law other than itself."' 63 Global
tribunals may also follow the teleological approach.' 64
The idea of individual interpretation in the civil law system is not so
much to decide individual disputes but to anticipate broader solutions.'
6
"[A]t no time can individual cases be allowed to blur the broader pic-
ture."'' 66 The code provides a stable platform from which to make these
leaps into the future. This grants the courts a broad sort of discretion.
Civil law decisions are expected to anticipate the future itself outside the
context of the individual controversy. Predictability of legal implications
for others in the same position is more important than the implications of
the result for a particular individual, even if the rule is harsh in a specific
case. Within this design is accommodation for equity in individual ap-
plication. Consistent with the overarching strategy, the power to consider
individual fairness must be delegated, although sometimes the delegation
may be implicit.' 68 Individual fairness must give way to legal certainty.
6
1
162. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 270.
163. Hein K6tz, Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50 MODERN L. REV. 1, 11 (1987)
(emphasis added).
164. For example, in WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001), the WTO Appellate Body was forced to interpret the Agreement's numerous enunciations
of "like products." See id. at 1 96-98. In determining the correct definition, the Appellate Body
noted that "the term 'like product' in Article I1:4 must be interpreted to give proper scope and
meaning to this principle. In short, there must be consonance between the objective pursued by
Article III, as enunciated in the 'general principle' articulated in Article II1:." Id. at T 98.
165. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 80.
166. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 216.
167. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 82.
168. Id. at 52-53.
169. Id. at 71.
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Accordingly, civil lawyers will expect supranational tribunals to individu-
alize according to these priorities.
C. Courts and Judges
Civil law courts tend to be specialized and hierarchical." 0 The judges
direct their proceedings. Their structure expresses a commitment to ex-
pertise and intellectualization. Thus, the civil law depends on the
intellectual capacity of its judges. German judges, in particular, are likely
to seek learnedness in their opinions.
7'
Civil law judges are part of the civil service.' Judges enter a career
of judging and advance through the judicial hierarchy.7 'They are edu-
cated and trained to be judges. In particular, their education and training
equips them to work with language and to engage in the rational and sci-
entific finding of the law. They then gain experience as judges. The
judicial hierarchy allows judicial authorities considerable control over
lower level judges.' 4 Opinions are anonymous and collegial. 7' They
rarely become known outside the legal profession, and even there, they do
not attain a special status. 176 Their training and experience creates an elite,
if anonymous, corps of adjudicators.
The same elite civil servants are not assured in the global judicial re-
gime. Global judges will come forward from national regimes. The
international community will hope that judges will be experienced, pro-
fessional judges, but that is not now certain. Surely, they will not always
have the training and experience that may be necessary to make the sys-
tem work as a civil law system.
Civil law decision-making compels its own kind of fact-finding and
record. Civil law judicial decision-making is supported by the "inquisito-
rial" procedures. The basic strategy of this procedural model is judicial
control, in contrast to the "adversary" system, which bestows control
upon the lawyers. At first blush, a judge-controlled process seems incon-
sistent with the basic distrust of courts. However, given the demands on
civil law judges, they have a justifiable need for a record adequate to
170. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 58.
171. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 130.
172. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 62.
173. ZWEIGERT & KTZ, supra note 83, at 124.
174. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 17 (1999) ("This institutional structure radically shapes the incentives judges face:
fundamentally it gives judges an incentive to act in those ways that the people deciding their
transfers consider appropriate.").
175. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 62.
176. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 125.
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perform those functions and for a broad range of advice, including expert
legal advice.
The ECJ provides a supranational adaptation of the judicial manage-
ment and expertise orientation of the civil law process. After the pleading
stage, the parties' control virtually ends, and the court takes over. One of
the judges is assigned the case and serves as a "judge-rapporteur," re-
sponsible for building the record. The rapporteur's report will serve as the
basis for a decision. An independent judicial officer, the "Advocate Gen-
eral," then considers the case. The Advocate General is part of the court,
and prepares an opinion to "assist" the Court. 7 Although the extent to
which the court adopts the Advocate General's opinion may vary, it is
invariably of extreme importance.7 8 As Amull observed: "[M]ost students
of the Court would probably say that it is fairly unusual-although by no
means unheard of-for the Court to depart from the Opinion of its Advo-
cate General and there are reasons for believing that, whether or not an
Opinion is followed, the judges find it helpful."'
79
The global tribunals might do well to borrow both the preparatory
judge and the Advocate General function from the ECJ. The preparatory
judges, as they do in the civil law process, balance out the inequality of
representation and assure that the court has the record it needs. The
ECJ-style Advocate General would provide expert support for global
judges of varying training and ability. Such a permanent and impartial
advisor to a global tribunal could also assure some certainty and uniform-
ity among tribunals representing diverse judicial characteristics. 8 o
177. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 222.
178. Advocates General seem to borrow from some common law reasoning in their opin-
ions, citing prior decisions as binding authority. This is not limited to Advocates General trained
in common law Member States. Striking examples can be found in decisions of German Advo-
cates General. T. Koopmans, Stare decisis in European Law, in ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND
INTEGRATION 11, 21 (David O'Keefe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1982). It is also interesting to
note that German barristers "try occasionally to convince the court that it should overrule an
earlier decision." Id. at 21. Perhaps the German legal professional is more comfortable using
case law in this way because case law is significantly important in Germany, even though it is
not considered an actual source of law. An accepted view is that judicial opinion in Germany is
an important authority in the development and application of new legal questions. See FRECK-
MAN & WEGERICH, supra note 30, at 46, 91; YOUNGS, supra note 109, at 53.
179. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 8 (1999).
180. Several other elements from this model might also recommend it in global adjudica-
tions, over and above the civil law's predominance in national legal cultures around the world.
Much of the preceding is in writing and the court has much more discretion to seek expert ad-
vice. Considerable resistance can be expected because, as discussed below, this process
challenges a common lawyers' sense of fair procedure, even though many of these elements can
be found in U.S. administrative adjudications.
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In the civil law system, appellate courts review lower court judgments
de novo."' Civil lawyers will expect global review-level tribunals to en-
gage in the same type of review. However, global judges may fall short of
the civil law's juridical ideal. These tribunals will be more political, and
their disagreement with lower tribunals will be suspect. 2A pattern of
disagreement will certainly affect the perception of any emerging global
review authority.
The civil law uses specialized tribunals. They serve the purpose of
promoting the civil law's desire for expertise and the societal role of
courts. However, the specialized tribunals also grew out of the need for
court-like bodies separate from the "judiciary." Thus, certain categories of
litigation, for example administrative disputes, proceeded through a spe-
cial court system. Judges in these courts were not selected according to
the strict professional standards of the judiciary, permitting selection for
subject-matter expertise and social policy perspective. More importantly,
these courts might take on functions that appear legislative." 3 Much the
same development may be seen in the U.S., but perhaps for different rea-
sons. Currently, many federal tribunals are not part of the judiciary as
created by Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
4
III. BLENDING TRANSATLANTIC LEGAL CULTURES
INTO A GLOBAL JUDICIARY
Having laid out some of the basic notions of the civil law model and
suggested how those notions might play out in global perspective, the
next step is to think about how the common law and civil law legal
cultures may interact in the global arena.'85 Some observe a convergence
of these two systems.'8 6 Surface similarities should not obscure the
181. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 59. The Supreme Court of Cassation, the highest French
court, is not strictly a court of appeals. It only reexamines points of law, and it may not revise
decisions, as would a court of appeals. CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 189 (2d ed. 1996). Interestingly, Article III of the U.S. Constitution expressly
grants the U.S. Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over facts as well as law.
182. The same weakness is observed in U.S. administrative law when the review tribunal
disagrees with the lower level.
183. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 134.
184. They are Article I courts and administrative agencies. See Judith Resnik, Rereading
"The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the
Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994).
185. National systems that mixed common law and civil law cover about 150 million
people. PALMER, supra note 77, at 3. Reimann argued that mixed common law and civil law
system can teach civilians about integration with modem legal cultures. Mathias Reimann, To-
wards a European Civil Code: Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic
Colleagues, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1337 (1999).
186. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 290 (summarizing convergence).
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fundamental ideological difference in the way each system conceptualizes
the law. Reimann recently observed:
[T]here are important divergencies between continental civil law
and (English, Irish, and to some extent Scottish) common law in
the fabric of private law itself. Even if one were to accept that the
substantive discrepancies between the civil and common law have
been overrated and that the systems have been converging, there
remain indisputable disparities regarding the respective concep-
tual tools and general structures.1
8
1
Because the differences are so deep seated, surface convergence is not
likely to relieve the basic tension between the two legal cultures as they
vie for place in the global arena.
The different fundamental principles and instincts lead lawyers and
scholars to approach legal questions quite differently. Lawyers and offi-
cials from the two regimes approach drafting and interpretation of the
framework documents in quite distinct ways. When a civil lawyer contests
against, or works with, a common lawyer, the two will have a fundamen-
tally different native sense of "law." Thus, it is useful to now turn to the
risky prediction of how the two regimes will be accommodated in a
global legal system. Again for emphasis, this framework anticipates the
contribution of other legal systems but finds a civil law and common law
base a very useful place to start.
A. Approach to Established and Foundational Legislation
The core distinction between civil law and common law is their ap-
proach to authoritative documents. Because of this difference, each will
expect founding agreements, global legislation, and pronouncements from
supranational governments to be drafted and interpreted with their own
approach in mind.1 8  Therefore, the merger will generate tension and per-
haps misunderstanding in both drafting and interpretative principles.
The simplistic distinction that the civil law follows statutes whereas
the common law leaves judges considerable freedom is belied by history.
Statutory interpretation has always been crucial to common law legal
reasoning. Indeed, it seems that Justice Coke created a weak commit-
ment to statutory interpretation and the exultation of judicial opinion.
That view never really dominated English legal thought. Indeed,
187. Reimann, supra note 185, at 1342.
188. Civil lawyers draft keeping interpretative principles in mind. VRANKEN, supra note
79, at 38.
189. J.W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CONCEP-
TION 61-62 (2000).
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Bonham's case,' 9 which established the principle of judicial dominance,
is remarkable in fact as an exception to the dominance of statutory lan-
guage, an exception that did not hold over time.'9 Even Coke recognized
that courts must follow the statute and exercise discretion only when the
language fails to answer a particular case. 192 This approach has not been
completely lost in the modem common law practice.93 Undeniably, how-
ever, U.S. jurisprudence has accepted a cavalier judicial approach to
legislative language.
In both systems, judges are bound in some degree by the language of
authoritative documents, and must engage in interpretation. As discussed
above, the civil law is dominated by scholars and academic lawyers,
whereas the common law is dominated by practitioners turned judges.
Thus, another area of tension is the relative weight of judicial
interpretation versus that of jurists. Merryman, for example, claims that
the common law is the law of judges and the civil law is the law of law
professors. 94 That is, judges who are the pinnacle of the law-development
process dominates the common law, whereas the civil law exults jurists
and scholarly development. Islamic law is also built on the work of
scholars.'95 Another one billion or so members of the world community
are likely to place special value on scholarly interpretation.
Nonetheless, it is the nature of the foundational written law, the con-
cept of a "code," and the ideology derived from a system founded on a
written base, that distinguishes the two legal cultures. 96 The nature of the
190. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610).
191. In commenting on Coke's audacity in declaring an act of Parliament void, Wade and
Forsyth state that, "No modem judge could repeat this exploit, for to hold an Act of Parliament
void is to blaspheme against the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty." WADE, supra note 72, at
467-68.
192. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND §
21 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1853) (1628).
193. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 26-27.
194. Id. at 59-60.
195. "Islamic law represents an extreme case of a 'jurist law'; it was created and further
developed by private specialists, a phenomenon well known to sociology of law .... JOSEPH
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 209-10 (1964). Islamic law provides the unique
phenomenon of legal science combined with scholarly handbooks having the force of law, not
the state playing the part of a legislator (to the extent to which Islamic law was applied in prac-
tice). This "classical" view of Islamic law is challenged to the extent to which the formative
scholars engaged in interpretation or creation.
196. This is not to say that the civil code has not been without its proponents in common
law countries. Jeremy Bentham and David Dudley Field, from the U.K. and the U.S. respec-
tively, were early proponents of civil law concepts. Jeremy Bentham's push for a 'complete
body' of law stretched across the Atlantic, going so far as to solicit then U.S. President James
Madison's permission to codify U.S. common law. See THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM: 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW AND EDUCATION
5 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998) (letter from Jeremy Bentham to James Madi-
son). Early in U.S. history, the civil law vied with common law.
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language itself is likely to be different. The code, as discussed above, is a
framework, creating at once a stable platform and a guide to adaptation.
Because experts draft the code, it constitutes an effort to rationalize the
basic laws (thereby channeling statutory and administrative laws). The
code concept requires faithfulness to language and a commitment to find
the law in authoritative documents.
It is then not so much the code itself but the legal philosophy, which
the code instills in the civil law mind that separates the two legal cultures.
Statutory language for modem common law, at least as manifest in the
U.S., is organic, a living creature. The U.S. approach easily recognizes
the need for judicial adaptation. It has not committed itself to a stable ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. Judicial authority in the civil system, as
discussed above, is limited. In other words, the strong judicial role of the
common law system permits "soft" statutory language, where the weak
civil judiciary requires "hard" language.' 97
Civil law-like ideological constraints are evident in international tri-
bunals. A somewhat extreme example can be observed when an
international tribunal observes a non liquet and does not resolve the
claims in a case. A non liquet occurs when a judicial body decides not to
decide a case because there is a "gap" in the law.9 The tribunal, in such a
case, is unwilling to go beyond textual language to decide disputes not
foreseen by treaty and statutory creators. GATT and WTO examples of
non liquets are the unadopted panel report in EEC Wheat Flour Export
Subsidies and the Coconuts case.' 99 This approach to international adjudi-
cation is also seen in ICJ jurisprudence. In South West Africa (Eth. v. S.
Afr.; Liber v. S. Afr.),2° the ICJ refused to decide a case because of the
Throughout [the period between the Revolution to the Civil War], but especially in
the middle decades, a determined effort was made by a succession of zealots to in-
troduce into the United States the institution and methods of the civil law, if not as a
substitute for, at least as a supplement to, those of the common law .... This propa-
ganda campaign failed to achieve its objects and is now largely overlooked.
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, in PETER STEIN, THE CHAR-
ACTER AND INFLUENCE OF ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 411 (1988). David Dudely
Field was Bentham's North American counterpart, working as the "pre-eminent figure in
American law reform." See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 186 (1981). He drew up his "Field Code" to replace
New York common law, covering almost every aspect of the law, including criminal law, civil
law, government organization, and court procedure. See Andrew P. Morriss et al., Debating the
Field Civil Code 105 Years Later, 61 MONT. L. REV. 371,373 (2000).
197. Mattei, supra note 128, at 17-18.
198. See William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Author-
ity?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79, 96 (2001).
199. Id.
200. 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
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lack of an "objective rule." It reasoned that any decision would force it to
go beyond its judicial mandate." 1
In order to predict how the two interpretative tendencies will interact,
one must begin by identifying the points of potential tension in the way
each treats statutory language. As discussed above, civil law lawyers see
interpretation as a scientific exercise.20 2 So the real working difference
between the two approaches to interpretation is the more structured ap-
proach of the civil law legal culture. Civil law interpretation proceeds
according to rules. Commentators aptly analogize the core concept to
chess. 203 Civil law judges move, but according to well established rules,
whereas common law judges often see statutory language as providing a
mere springboard from which they create the law for a specific case.
Language in civil law interpretation provides a stable platform, a frame-
work, from which the civil law judge must work li This sense of stability
may unsettle U.S. lawyers, and they may not readily understand the
moves civil law insists on, especially since U.S. jurisprudence has be-
come imbued with realism and post-modernism.0 5 While judges in each
system must apply clear language, a civil law judge actually takes their
duty to find the meaning of the language seriously, to honestly engage in
interpretation.2 6 That approach is often termed "grammatical," and is, in
reality, quite different from "interpretation" engaged in by U.S. judges.'O
201. Patricial Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking "Reasonable Ex-
pectations", 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1638 n. 197 (1999).
202. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 63-64.
203. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 48. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 66. In some sense,
however, this may be a universal character of law itself, existing in the common law system as
well. Likewise:
There is a sense in which [Stanley] Fish's conception of law as a self-contained prac-
tice is unexceptional. Indeed, to the extent that law is given structure by, and
functions in accordance with, a particular combination of certain rules, norms, stan-
dards, and conventions, it seems clear that it is a unique and self-contained practice.
In this sense, law is a self-contained practice just as is a game like chess or checkers.
MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 42 (1998).
204. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 270.
205. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1352 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds.,
2d ed. 2001). "[A]lI [post-modernists] agree that moral responsiveness is neither a product of
deliberation or argument, or something that a theoretical justification would secure." Mattei,
supra note 128, at 13. Mattei advocates a "hard" European code in this environment because the
weak postmodem sense of the law works to the advantage of the economically and politically
strong.
206. See DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 267-69.
207. Lasser describes the difference in terms of two modes: grammatical and policy her-
meneutics. "Unlike the French judicial system, which offers two relatively segregated modes of
discourse (the official/grammatical and the unofficial/hermeneutic), the American judicial sys-
tem tends to combine the grammatical and hermeneutic discourse in a single space-the judicial
opinion." Lasser, supra note 147, at 702. He goes on to demonstrate in these terms how, in the
U.S., judicial text displaces the primary text:
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A U.S. jurist might characterize the difference in the two visions of
judicial conduct as between formalism and realism. A U.S. lawyer
views the civil law approach as formalistic, even though such a charac-
terization fails to capture the subtleties of the civil law approach. De Cruz
has observed, for example, that the French approach is formalistic, the
U.S. approach is instrumental, and English law lies somewhere in be-
tween." In U.S. jurisprudence, realism with respect to what judges do
has been converted into what they ought to do. Its philosophy sets the ju-
diciary free not just to interpret, but to "legislate," restrained only by the
context of the individual dispute. U.S. interpretation contemplates judges
balancing the interests embodied in the legislation rather than merely
finding meaning in the language.1 ° It is not in its insistence on the binding
force of language, but on the style of judicial development that civil law
will contest with common law.
As discussed previously in Section HA, the scientific method sup-
porting the civil law approach parallels what in U.S. jurisprudence is
termed "categorization."2 ' Categorization has been an important, and of-
ten dominant, strategy in the U.S. 22 Yet, categorization is often criticized
by modem U.S. commentators as insensitive and static. As discussed,
both the civil law system and categorization are adaptive and creative, but
their progressive principles require a special kind of manipulation. Cate-
gorization creates a structured creativity in the law so that logic and
experience move the law according to certain established concepts.
In modem U.S. jurisprudence, the categorization approach often gives
way to balancing. "Balancing requires the explicit articulation and com-
parison of rights or structural provisions, modes of infringement, and
government interests. 21 3 One might argue that balancing is inherently
The shift to purposive discourse and effect orientation represents a shift away from gram-
matical reading; it represents the deprioritizing of a certain "literalist"-or, in current legal terms,
"formalist"-mode of reading in favor of an explicitly hermeneutic approach. This new approach
seeks to generate the meaning of the controlling legal text by reading the language of the text in
terms of something else: its purpose and practical effect.
Id. at 703.
208. See generally Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Juris-
prudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089-90 (2000). For the impact in civil law, see MERRYMAN,
supra note 102, at 45-46.
209. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 289.
210. See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405,456 (1989).
211. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 63, 66-67.
212. See Kennedy, supra note 158, at 3-4. Kennedy's "classical legal thought" seems the
equivalent of what is termed here "categorization": "Classical legal thought was an ordering, in
the sense that it took a very large number of actual processes and events and asserted that they
could be reduced to a much smaller number with a definite pattern." Id. at 8.
213. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 61 (1992).
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consonant with common law in much the same way categorization is with
the civil law.2' 4 Balancing presents some methodological opportunities
that suggest it to the common law mind. Balancing offers an opportunity
for a judge to tailor the law to a particular litigation; it seems less abstract
and more sensitive to individual circumstances. On the other hand, bal-
ancing has been criticized as allowing judicial law making based on
personal prejudice and preference."' A corrupt resort to the balancing
strategy can be a tool for deceit and special interest promotion, just as
honest employment illuminates sensitive comparisons of accepted val-
ues.216 The freedom won through balancing, at its best, assists the judge in
doing individual justice, but this freedom also necessarily creates the op-
portunity for abuse. Sullivan, for example, summarizes the view that
categorization reduces the potential of the decision maker to "factor[] the
parties' particular attractive or unattractive qualities into the decision
making calculus. 2 7
The adaptability of balancing to judge-dominated policymaking is
another aspect of balancing that fits the modem U.S. instinct for judicial
activism but may offend civil law instincts. Balancing permits judges to
justify policymaking based upon on the circumstances of the individual
case before them. Yet, the very focus on an individual case recommends
against balancing for broad policymaking. Through balancing, judicial
policymaking may be opportunistic in disregarding and modifying past
approaches, but they are also limited in their policy choices by the context
of the case presented. On the other hand, as discussed in Part 1I, civil
judges may not allow individual disputes to cloud their vision of societal
values. In short, civil lawyers may find that balancing fails policymaking
because of its tendency to narrow perspective as well as its weakness in
incorporating past learning.
Balancing, however, is not a necessary aspect of the common law ap-
proach to interpretation. Not only is judicial resort to balancing a fairly
new development in U.S. judicial justification, but U.S. courts still engage
in categorization. Balancing was not prevalent in Supreme Court opinions
214. Aleinikoff, supra note 157, 961 (suggesting that balancing approaches mimic com-
mon law approaches, thereby permitting flexibility and providing a strategy for legal
development).
215. Id. at 962.
216. Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Be-
tween the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 970 (1994) (asserting that a
balancing method can be employed for honest or dishonest purposes, depending on the intent of
the person employing the method).
217. Sullivan, supra note 213, at 62.
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until the second quarter of 20th century.28 Although the modem U.S. legal
mind seems most comfortable with justifications based on balancing,
judges today are just as apt to rely on categorization.2 9 As Sheppard ob-
served: "The Court balances, and the Court categorizes. Not only are both
methods compatible, but both are now sufficiently entrenched as judicial
tools of adjudication that the Court is unlikely to rewrite so much prece-
dent merely because of a mode of interpretation.,,2 ' Today, however,
categorization is seen as doctrinaire and stifling, i.e. inherently conserva-
tive, and hence balancing has come to be seen as a progressive approach
to law.22'
A balancing approach, used in a global context with diverse cultures,
would be particularly difficult to implement. It would raise the specter of
all sorts of cultural, racial, regional and ethnic conflicts. Balancing nec-
essarily sets values, often fundamental, against each other. Balancing will
thus generate tension independent of the level of freedom granted to
judges. Even in the context of U.S. culture, some doubt that values are
sufficiently commensurate to validate the use of a balancing approach in
222many cases. For instance, it may be deceptive to attempt to denominate
218. Aleinikoff, supra note 157, at 949 ("The great constitutional opinions of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century did not employ balancing as a method of constitutional
argument or justification.").
219. For example, Kathleen Sullivan observed that Supreme Court Justices divided over
the choice between "rules" (a categorization-based approach) and "standards" (a balanc-
ing-based approach) in the 1991 term. Sullivan, supra note 213, at 69.
220. Sheppard, supra note 216, at 975.
221. But see id. at 973 ("[T]he discussion about whether the balancing or the categorical
approach is better ... reflects a false dichotomy."). Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Bal-
ancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 838 (1994) ("The dispute over
categorization and balancing is miscast for three reasons. First, the methods are not often deter-
minative. Second, the methods can often be translated into one another. Third, ... the dispute is
miscast because the decision between balancing and not balancing is illusory."). In fact, balanc-
ing often, especially in application, evolves into categories. Categories are in some sense
established, justified and adjusted through "global balancing." Aleinikoff, supra note 157, at
978. "Categoric balancing" may in reality be seen as either balancing or categorization; the
balance once struck is applied as categories. Indeed, exposition on, or a derivation from, princi-
ples may look to balancing as well as classification. Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability:
A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 819-820 (1994). Even ad hoc balanc-
ing would be too burdensome to decision makers without certain standards or limits on the
range of issues for which balancing actually is to be employed. Gottlieb, supra, at 855-56. Sul-
livan concluded: "These distinctions between rules and standards, categorization and balancing,
mark a continuum, not a divide." Sullivan, supra note 213, at 61.
222. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv.
779, 786 (1994). The incommensurability debate is informative, but is generally beyond the
scope of this Article. See Symposium: Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169
(1998).
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rights in a single currency and weigh their relative worth. 2 3 The of-
ten-subconscious realization that the interests involved are not actually
comparable leads courts to camouflage the "intuitive" nature of their de-
cisions with balancing justifications. Even if Schauer is correct in
arguing that it may be preferable to base rights decisions on imperfect
commensurability in values accepted in U.S. culture, the complexity of
commensurability in the global community still dictates against judicial
225balancing as an interpretative device.
In sum, both ideologies accommodate growth and adjustment in the
treatment of authoritative documents. General principles of international
law might support both. Whereas the Vienna Convention requires a strong
commitment first to text, and then its history, it also recognizes modifica-
226
tion by "subsequent practice. Yet, the more structured civil law system's
approach to adaptation and creativity may be more defensible in the
global arena.
B. Disagreement Over Fundamental Principles
Fundamental principles become important to interpretation under any
legal regime. While civil law and common law legal cultures have some
basic disagreements regarding interpretation, they share many fundamen-
tal principles. These philosophies and principles are not shared throughoutthe glbal •227
the global community. Disagreements at fundamental levels are very
difficult to negotiate and compromise.2 " Thus, in the global arena, legal
223. Aleinikoff, supra note 157, at 973 ("The problem for constitutional balancing is the
derivation of the scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency for
comparison.").
224. Id. at 975-76 (identifying several techniques courts "adopt to strike the unstrikeable
balance."). Aleinikoff finds that the U.S. Supreme Court resort to a vocabulary that creates the
appearance of comparison, depreciation of one of the interests, and statements of the problem in
balancing terms, but in actually they decide the case on very different grounds.
225. Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 785, 806 (1994) (arguing that decision making that holds rights commensurable
to the greatest extent possible may still be valuable). Schauer propounds a kind of second-best
argument whereby shutting down the analysis in the absence of perfect commensurability is
inferior to making a decision based on imperfect commensurability. Id. at 799.
226. Vienna Convention: Treaties, supra note 130, at art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
("any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation").
227. For example, some cultures might choose societal values over the dominance of the
individual. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX 77 (1991) (noting criticism of the adoption of the civil law system because "intrinsic
to Western private law was a radical individualism that could only erode Japan's historical ori-
entations and understandings involving the family, authority, and the state."). See also VICKI C.
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248 (1999) ("The Chinese
constitutions assume that the purpose of rights is to enable citizens to support the broader inter-
ests of the community.").
228. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES (2d ed. 1991).
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notions derived from fundamental principles may be the focus of the most
difficult legal conflicts to resolve.
The underlying aspect of a natural law foundation inherent in the civil
code, as noted in the prior section, might be difficult for other cultures to
accept. Even U.S. lawyers, who might share some of the civil law's fun-
damental principles, might not accept their natural law source. Pound
observed that both the civil and common law moved away from natural
law in the 19th century. 229 The two cultures diverge as to the implications
of that movement. U.S. legal philosophy has little regard, even disdain,
for natural law, whereas, as discussed in the prior part, natural law is still
respected in the civil law world at least as one source of codification. Ar-
guments with a natural law feel in the global context might have more
230currency for civilians than common lawyers.
Similarly, the evolution of the civil law relied on secular natural law.
Many of the world's legal systems, which include a large portion of the
world's population, have strong, if not dominant, religious aspects. 23'
Legal systems that are consciously religious, such as those with Islamic
and Hindu elements, will resist even the secularization goal. More to the
point, they can be expected to inject religious elements into the global
legal dialogue.
On the other hand, the sources of fundamental principles in transat-
lantic legal culture are in fact religious. The religious base of transatlantic
law will be a source of tension in the global arena. Canon, or Catholic,
law is one of the three jus commune, or sources of civil law.232 Although
the code attempted to secularize the law, its religious genesis cannot be
ignored. A look at any of its founding documents reveals that basic U.S.
principles also have a religious base. Like the civil law, the U.S. legal
culture has attempted to secularize these principles, but their origins can-
not be denied. Those from non-Christian legal cultures will find the
229. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 145-47 (1963) ("Although
eighteenth-century natural law had led to codification and had become an absolute system it
was not equal to the philosophical problem of nineteenth-century law.").
230. Interestingly, the code concept is based on an acceptance of natural law. See
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83. U.S. legal thought is not just hostile to natural law, but de-
nies the existence of any essential principles. Nonetheless, much of the balancing analysis
engaged in by U.S. courts has the feel of natural law analysis.
231. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India
and Israel, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 101, 103 (2000) (noting the "distinctive religious legacy" of these
countries' legal systems). Hindu law covers about 450 million people. ZWEIGERT & KoTZ,
supra note 83, at 313. Islamic law covers in some way all 1.2 billion Muslims. ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 2002 BOOK OF THE YEAR 302. Approximately one billion Muslims live in either
Islamic legal systems or a system in which Islamic law is mixed with other forms, usually either
civil law or common law. See generally CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
232. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 10-11.
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inherent validity of these principles debatable. Indeed, the religious back-
ground of the principles by itself will make them suspect. Many will
prefer their own religiously-based legal principles. Again, these types of
disagreements are particularly difficult to work out.
International agreements, rather than judicial decisions, will mediate
many of these fundamental conflicts. To the extent that agreements estab-
lishing supranational governments are constitutional in nature, they will
233
address some fundamental principles. Their constitutional stature will
take issues off the table and hence dictate fundamental values to future
generations. Thus, tension will grow between the vision of the founding
generation and that of any current generation. Moreover, many
non-transatlantic participants will not be able to affect the basic agree-
ments. Those unable to participate will resent particularly the embedding
of fundamental principles in basic documents of supranational govern-
ments.
On the other hand, international participants finesse rather than con-
front many of these issues in the basic agreements. The very emotional
explosiveness of fundamental principles, especially those with religious
bases, will convince negotiators to avoid those controversies, leaving
many of them to be resolved in the adjudicative context. Many have ob-
served that the concession of authority by political institutions often
results from the desire to avoid difficult decisions. 23 Global tribunals will
need to defuse tensions by adjusting foundational language and resolving
residual fundamental issues.
In short, global tribunals will have to accommodate a wide range of
foundational principles. The comparative law's identification of "fami-
lies" of legal cultures may help rationalize these fundamental conflicts.236
Zweigert and Kotz, in their leading comparative work, recommend that
233. Undeniably, the basic supranational agreements have constitutional aspects. See
McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 11.
234. Constitutions freeze fundamental values. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 24
(explaining how the rigidity of constitutions "impair[s] the legislature's monopoly on lawmak-
ing."). A constitution might be seen as resolving in an especially stable way certain fundamental
societal issues, thereby permitting society to operate without (constantly) revisiting those issues.
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 639 (1991) ("Con-
stitutional provisions may be facilitative in quite another sense: a decision to take certain issues
off the ordinary political agenda may be indispensable to the political process"). In a sense, a
code does just the opposite; it identifies issues that must be resolved in individual context.
235. E.g., JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1978); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional
and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469,499-500 (1985).
236. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 110, at 17 ("In law, as in other sciences, one can
detect the existence of a limited number of types or categories within which this diversity can be
organized.... [T]he comparatist can classify laws by reducing them to a limited number of
families.").
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the world's legal cultures can be distinguished according to their "styles,"
much like different categories of literature or fine arts.237 They use five
factors to classify legal families:
(1) its historical background and development, (2) its predomi-
nant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters,
(3) especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources
it acknowledges and the way it handles them, and (5) its ideol-
238
ogy.
Based on these factors, they identify six groupings (Romanistic,
Germanic, Anglo-American, Nordic, Far East, and Religious) and pro-
vide careful analysis of their distinctive features. However, although
academically predominant, the strong transatlantic bias in these classifi-
cations raises questions that may require contributions from other
societies as the global legal culture evolves. Here, it is sufficient to view
this approach and the sophisticated work done by these and other com-
parative scholars to find commonality among categories of legal cultures
as a useful device for melding the world's legal cultures, even in terms of
fundamental principles.
C. Use of Case Law
The function and status of case law is the generally understood dif-
ference between the two systems of civil and common law. However, as
with the popular view regarding differences in statutory interpretation, the
disparity here is subtle. First, as is generally recognized, the approach to
judicial decisions does differ, both in kind and degree, but civil law opin-
ions are not without effect. Nonetheless, a sense of convergence in
attention to the work of other judges does not affect the ideological dis-
tinction between judicial authority and judicial law making within the two
systems. Second, the civil law doctrine has its own commitment to con-
sistency, but that doctrine aims at overall consistency, not just consistency
in dispute resolution. Third, the reputed distinction between the common
law's inductive approach and the civil law's deductive approach masks the
real difference in the logic applied when deciding cases, and hence the
very impact of case law. Fourth, it is generally perceived that common
law judges have more authority over legal questions than civil law judges,
but they do not have more authority over their own cases. That is, the
237. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 67-68.
238. Id. at 68. But categorization requires sophisticated analysis: "These are the stylistic
factors which enable us to identify the families of legal systems and to attribute individual sys-
tems to them, but the weight to be given to each of these factors varies according to the
circumstances." Id. at 72.
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concept of judicial authority is different, but in deciding cases the differ-
ence may not be the degree of judicial power but the nature of judicial
power. These confusions must be worked out in order to envision the
melding of the two systems in a global regime.
First, while there is a difference in the weight each system gives to
prior decisions, that difference only partially explains the difference in
impact prior decisions make in judging. Civil law judges do in fact take
prior decisions into account. Indeed, Merryman observed: "A lawyer pre-
paring a case searches for cases in point, uses them in his argument; and
the judge deciding a case often refers to prior cases."'239 Only a fool would
refuse to seek guidance in the work of other judges confronted with simi-
lar problems. The civil law system is unlikely to produce any more fools
than the common law system.
Nonetheless, because the instincts of the two systems are fundamen-
tally different, the convergence, some observe, confuses form with
substance. The difference is not refusal to note precedent, but the ideology
of stare decisis.24 0 That is, the common law holds onto the idea that prior
decisions are binding on subsequent judges, so that judges and everyone
else must consider case decisions to be "law." True, the relevant law is not
fundamentally derived from judicial decisions in common law systems,
and hence common law judges must interpret and apply statutory lan-
guage. True, common law judges seem less inclined to observe stare
decisis than common law doctrine would dictate. At the same time, civil
law judges are paying more attention to their colleagues' decisions than
one might assume. Lawyers in civil law systems certainly refer to prior
decisions. As translated into E.U. law, civil law judges are assuming more
authority, and are more actively making law. Still, in the end, judging in-
dividual cases is fundamentally different. There remains a great gap in
respective judicial goals. And there remains a fundamental difference in
the impact those decisions have.2'
239. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 47.
240. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 120, at 83. Furthermore:
[W]hether credence can be accorded to the popular view that the Civil Law is differ-
entiated from the Common Law by its refusal to accept the principle of stare decisis
.... [plersonally I doubt whether any general answer can be given to it. Of course in
the strict sense that a judge is absolutely bound by a previous decision which he
knows to be radically wrong in logic, justice, and common sense, no Civil Law judge
adheres to the principle.
Id.
241. Francisco Ramos, Judicial Cooperation in the European Courts: Testing Three Mod-
els of Judicial Behavior, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 16 (2002) (arguing that while
European courts use other courts' decision, "[tihe fact that there is no obligation of stare decisis
makes courts less aware and less use to the usage of decisions of other courts. This will certainly
result in divergence among and within countries.").
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In global decisions, global judges will pay attention to the opinions of
their colleagues, and hence will tend towards a system of precedent. Re-
nowned expert Shabtai Rosenne notes-that the ICJ Charter,
contains an apparent limitation on the Court's freedom to employ
judicial decisions as a subsidiary means for the determination of
the rules of law. This, however, is not the interpretation placed
upon that provision by the Court, which habitually refers to its
242own decisions and those of the [predecessor] Permanent Court.
Therefore, global legal culture may already be accustomed to giving
case law precedential force. But global tribunals may use precedent more
as the civil law does, because its limits on judicial law development may
be more appropriate to the international arena. Governments, including
common law jurisdictions, will want more control, especially "statutory"
control, over the global judiciary than afforded by the common law ap-
proach. The authority of case law in the global arena will be more a
matter of acquiescence than imposition of common law stare decisis.
To some extent, the supranational tribunals themselves hold the key to
asserting their authority to develop law. While the code concept itself
grew from, and has largely been adopted around the world because of, a
distrust of courts, a growing respect for courts is now present. The U.S.
experience has demonstrated the advantages of strong courts. The status
of courts has changed in European civil law countries. More to the point,
their civil law progeny, the ECJ, has been a very activist court, and has
enjoyed the trust of E.U. citizens.4 Therefore, the global judiciary can
overcome any inherent distrust of courts. To the extent they do, they, like
the ECJ, will find their opinions having considerable, even approaching
binding, force outside the adoption of a formal sense of stare decisis.
The increasing weight given precedent by the ECJ demonstrates
natural evolution in supranational law, even one based on civil law princi-
ples. The E.U. treaty clearly envisions courts, both E.U. and national
courts, being prominent players in European affairs and not being subju-
gated to other E.U. or national institutions.2 45 Ramos found that the very
242. ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 1609.
243. "Legal scholars have explained national government acceptance of the ECJ's su-
premacy declaration based on the compelling nature of legal reasoning, the authority of the legal
process itself, and the respect and reverence accorded to the decisions of high judicial bodies."
Alter, supra note 49, at 184 (noting also that others see it as a mere power grab).
244. The ECJ's ability to definitively interpret E.U. law gives its opinions force, creating a
culture of attention to case law even in civil law countries. Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 13,
at 6 ("[A]lthough the judgment does not form binding precedent in the way understood in the
Anglo-Saxon legal systems, it has normative value in that it settles a point of interpretation or
validity").
245. See generally VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 194-209.
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act of "law finding" in the E.U.'s quasi-civil law system naturally creates
weight for precedent.2 6 In fact, judge-made law is apparent in the ECJ.247
In a preliminary ruling requested by a German court, for example, the
ECJ noted that because the protection of legitimate expectations exists as
a general principle of law in the E.U.'s member states, then it must be
protected as a principle of Community law.248 However, in a later case, the
ECJ applied the principle of legitimate expectations in a way, which
seemed contrary to the laws of most, if not all, member-states. 249 Ake-
hurst described what occurred in this case: "Each successive judgment of
the Court slightly alters the content of the principle, so that the Court can
end up by applying a principle in a manner which is contrary to the laws
of all the member states."2 ' In short, its growing legitimacy and record of
competence allows the ECJ to apply its own law with some force.
The use of case law in the global arena is complicated by the absence
of a structured global judicial system. Precedent has both horizontal and
vertical effects.25" ' The horizontal effect of precedent defines how strongly
a court feels bound by its own prior decisions. No matter which legal ide-
ology is dominant, courts tend to use their own prior decisions to inform
the case at hand. In the global arena, however, the vertical impact is am-
biguous and ad hoc. Common lawyers are accustomed to great weight
2522being given higher court precedent in lower courts. In contrast, as de-
scribed in Section II.C, civil law incorporates control over lower courts,
but that control, in specific cases, is not nearly as strong as that in com-
mon law systems. In addition, the hierarchy of global judicial systems is
not clearly established. In short, the lack of vertical authority in the global
legal regime will continue to be most frustrating to common lawyers,
certainly more so than to civilians. The tangle of both trade and rights
supranational adjudicative structures will prevent a cure to this frustration,
246. Ramos, supra note 241, at 12. "[A]djudicating in the European context has become
more like a team enterprise." Id at 18.
247. Michael Akehurst, The Application of General Principles of Law by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 39-40 (1981).
248. Westzucher GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fuir Zucher, 1973 E.C.R. 723, 739.
249. Commission v. Council, 1973 E.C.R. 575, 584, 592-95. The court here applied le-
gitimate expectations in a general way, but the laws of the member states allowed the principle
to be applicable only to individual decisions.
250. Akehurst, supra note 247, at 40. Akehurst went on to state, "what the Court is really
doing is creating law ... there is no reason to believe that the law created by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities will be any less satisfactory than the English common law
(emphasis in original).
251. PALMER, supra note 77, at 51-53.
252. The strength of hierarchical precedent in practice is somewhat ambiguous. Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedent?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817
(1994) (explaining how lower U.S. courts find ways around high court precedent).
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until a firm judicial hierarchy is agreed upon for whatever theoretical
weight should be assigned to precedent.
A second subtlety in distinguishing the use of case law in the two
systems derives from the civil law's own doctrines compelling consis-
tency, the overarching concept of "legal certainty". 253 Both philosophies
attempt to provide certainty to those covered by the law. The civil law
system requires its judges to be faithful to statutory schemes, and the
common law system requires commitment to prior, like decisions. Civil
law judges must assure certainty within the whole society and not just
consistency in dispute resolution. They decide individual cases in the
254context of a broad fabric of the law. Legal certainty requires the civil
255law judge to be sensitive to societal factors. In contrast, the common
law judge is charged with applying the "law" in order to render individual
fairness, but is also committed to treating like cases alike.
For this reason, civil law judges are more constrained than common
law judges by specific statutory language. Nonetheless, U.S. jurispru-
dence also struggles with the overall confusion created by judicial law
making. Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court has been a
strong advocate for judicial faithfulness to language. For example, in his
concurring opinion in Conroy v. Aniskoff, he criticized the Court for not
adhering to the literal language of the statute. He argued that
free-wheeling interpretation "undermines the clarity of law.' 257 Many
common law jurists over the years have argued that the law should be
predictable. Treating like cases alike can do this, but perhaps not on as
broad a scale as the civil law doctrine of legal certainty. Tension between
the two legal ideologies in the global arena then may be better character-
ized as disagreement over the doctrine employed to ensure predictability
in the law.
253. "The most commonly invoked rational judgment criterion is a specific form of con-
sistency-the maintenance of a stable rule over time. This principle, captured in the doctrine of
stare decisis, secures structural values such as predictability, stability, efficiency, and judicial
legitimacy." Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MIcH. L. REV. 2297, 2306 (1999) (citing Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571,
595-602 (1987)).
254. See VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 43; see also LAWSON, supra note 120, at 80-81.
255. The doctrine of legal certainty itself has its own law-making capacity. For example,
the ECJ in Case 69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council, 1991 ECR 1-02069, constructed
the estoppel rule, which has no equivalent in Europe, out of the legal certainty and legitimate
expectations principles. In doing so, "[tihe Court ... promote[d] an adequate standard of civil
rights' protection and procedural guarantees in Community law." Jirgen Schwarze, Judicial
Review in EC Law-Some Reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT' L &
COMPAR, L.Q. 17, 21 (2002).
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A third subtlety is that a difference in the logic used to decide cases
has been expressed too formally. Civil law reasoning is said to be "deduc-
tive" (conclusions following from broad premises), whereas common
lawyers are said to engage in "inductive" reasoning (reasoning from par-
ticular to general, or from a part to the whole). According to a Canadian
Supreme Court judge conversant with both systems, there is:
[A] difference in intellectual approach, in the quest and ordering
of knowledge. Each approach reflects one of the modes of func-
tioning of the human intellect, that is, on the one hand, the
empirical mode based on specific instances from which one may
eventually draw rules and even identify principles and, on the
other, the theoretical approach based on established principles
from which concrete consequences and applications are drawn.58
This traditional distinction may not, however, express the true differ-
ence. As Lawson observed:
I have some doubt [that civil law reasoning is deductive whereas
common law reasoning is inductive] .... In both cases the gen-
eral principle has to be found, in typical Common Law reasoning
by grouping together a number of decisions and constructing
equations explaining them, in the Civil Law by grouping together
a number of texts .... A more important difference is probably to
be found in the fact that whereas the materials from which the
common lawyer has to find his general principles are constantly
added to, and their general shape and balance altered by new de-
cisions ... [the civilian's] ultimate mass of materials remains
unchanged.259
Actually, there probably is some sense in which civil law instinctively
reasons from larger principles, as judges and lawyers must start with the
code framework, and the common law instinctively begins with specific
decisions that must be put together in order to divine the large principles.
That is what common law lawyers learn to do starting from law school.
But this difference in "logic" is probably the result of the sources and
stability of sources, rather than a conscious commitment to a particular
logical methodology.
A fourth subtlety must be recognized based on the difference between
the authority of judicial opinions and the authority of judges. The theo-
retical power to make law is not the same as the power to decide the law
258. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 215-16, quoting Charles D. Gonthier, Some Comments
on the Common Law and the Civil Law in Canada: Influences, Parallel Developments and
Borrowings, 21 CAN. Bus. L.J. 323 (1993).
259. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 65.
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in an individual case. In a particular case, civil law judges have more dis-
cretion than common law judges because they may decide how much
weight to give the opinions of other judges.260 Theoretically, common law
judges are bound by like cases whether they agree or not.
So, because civil law judges have more discretion about the weight
they give to prior decisions, in a sense they have more authority to think
about their cases in broader terms than common law judges. Common law
judges concentrate on applying the law to the individual dispute. Thereby,
as cases are decided individually, the law evolves interstitially. Civil law
judges are expected to decide their cases as part of a broader fabric. They
are more interested in finding the right decision, assuring aggregate fair-
ness, than in assuring fairness in the individual case before them. Thus,
the freedom from binding precedent is the freedom to assure that the case
at hand conforms to the scheme of authoritative documents and the "law"
in general, rather than to agree with colleague's judgments of equally
narrow scope.
In sum, added together, these subtle differences in legal philosophy
will affect the use of case law in the global arena. U.S. jurists will argue
for strong, even binding, effect for precedent.16 Civil law jurists will not
resist the use of prior cases in making arguments and decisions, but they
will expect global judges to exercise the freedom to find the law in indi-
vidual cases consistent with their system. Global law will no doubt evolve
through case law, but it is doubtful that case law will ever attain stare de-
cisis effect.
D. Nature of the Judicial Decision Makers
Much of the division between the civil law and common law results
from different perceptions of the courts, and the relationship between
courts and the "democratic" institutions of government. The diverse his-
torical experience with courts will affect how the systems are adapted in
the global arena. Simply put, the common law grew out of distrust of
majorities in democratic government, and the civil law reflects a distrust
260. Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the
French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1332 (1995) ("He is left entirely to his own de-
vises.").
261. Bhala advocates the use of stare decisis in supranational tribunals. Raj Bhala, The
Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 873 (2001); see also Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare
Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999).
Bhala proposed an amendment to GATT adopting stare decisis as the rule in WTO adjudica-
tions. Id. at 878.
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of elitist courts.26 2 Although not universal, civil law jurisprudence grew
out of experience that suggests that courts can do at least as much damage
as any other institution of government.
Such experiences are rare in U.S. history. The courts have more often
been the vehicle of progress and protection of individual rights. In the
early English experience of the common law, judges were allies of par-
liament in the struggle against royal (executive) authority. In the U.S.,
judicial independence from majoritarianism begins with Article III of the
Constitution, and carries forward in essential concepts evolved over some
200 years. 26' The U.S. experience may justify a special commitment to the
courts as the "least dangerous" branch, as the contrary experience in civil
264law nations justified distrust of courts .
Many emerging democracies come from a revolutionary experience
similar to France. This experience provides much of the real world impe-
tus behind the choice of the civil law system. Constraining judicial
abuse runs through civil law judicial thinking. This reality resonates
around the world because emerging democracies also have reason to dis-
trust their judiciaries. Indeed, revolutionary Communist constitutions
subjugate the judiciary to the legislature. Hence, the former Communist
countries, influenced by their previous regimes, are acutely aware of the
266potential for judicial abuse.
Because the ideologies of the civil and common law emerged from
conflicting realities, it may be hard to reconcile the two visions of the
262. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 63. Perhaps it is significant that Montesquieu, the god-
father of U.S. separation of powers theory, served as president of a parlement at a time when
those courts were fighting to retain their traditional powers and privileges. SIMON SCHAMA,
CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 107 (1989). Indeed, one contemporary
commentator admonished: "0 Montesquieu, you are a Magistrate, a Gentleman, a rich man; you
found it congenial ... to demonstrate the advantages of a government in which you occupied an
advantageous place." Id. at 121.
263. Actually, long tradition, rather than the U.S. Constitution, insulates courts from the
democratic institutions, because it is generally conceded that Art. III, if read literally, provides
for significant legislative control of the judiciary.
264. Brickel's famous and perhaps elitist characterization incorporates the notion that
courts are also dangerous but somewhat more trustworthy than the democratic institutions.
ALEXANDER M. BRICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
265. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 63, see also supra footnote 262, and accompanying text.
266. For example, the Chinese Constitution Article 128 provides that, "The Supreme Peo-
ple's Court is responsible to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee."
XIANFA art. 128 (1982). Article 67 states:
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following func-
tions and powers:
(1) to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement;
(4) to interpret statutes...
Id. at art. 67.
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courts. Even in Continental Europe, however, courts are increasingly
called upon to vindicate individual rights and societal values. The ECJ,
the E.U. court created and accepted by civil law E.U. members, has not
been put under strong restraints. 267 The E.U. treaties themselves authorize
the Court to review and overturn legislation as well as discipline member
governments. The ECJ has found its power similar to that of the U.S. ju-
diciary: its power to mediate between the executive and legislative
branches, and between the federal government and the states, is a source
of much of its power. Its very un-civil law activism has resulted from this
authority.
For whatever reason, not only is the ECJ a much more activist court,
more closely aligned with U.S. courts, but it has made other European
courts much more aggressive. Thus, we might predict that the attitude of
the U.S. courts over the last few generations, and that of the ECJ and its
effect on member's courts, have combined to create an emerging global
judicial attitude in which courts do not shrink from challenging legislative
and executive action either by their own supranational governments or by
member state governments. This attitude contrasts with the traditional
civil law attitude, but has been increasingly accepted in civil law legal
cultures.
One can expect both the WTO and the ICJ to be reasonably aggres-
sive in carrying forward their respective global missions. The ICJ has
already been characterized as activist. 69 Those familiar with the history of
U.S. federal courts and the ECJ will predict that, in this era at least, su-
pranational tribunals will accept broad authority, and members will
ultimately concede the necessity to do so. For example, a former ICJ
Registrar noted that Court's development in this direction:
The impression I had initially when I came to the Court was that
it appeared as if the intellectual effort was being made to dismiss
cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the period before
1984, and that this effort had turned, rather, to try to find ways to
267. See generally VRANKEN, supra note 79.
268. An extreme example of judicial activism is the Indian Supreme Court's decision
striking down a properly enacted constitutional amendment because the amendment violated
fundamental rights. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India:
Attempting the Impossible, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 510 (1989). "[I]nconvenient Supreme Court
decisions on the constitutionality of state action were simply overturned by amending the con-
stitution until the 'basic structure' of the constitution was declared unalterable." Id. at 501. On
the other hand: "The notion that the constitution has an unalterable basic structure remains a
highly problematic and controversial element of Indian constitutional law." Id. at 501, n.34.
269. American Society of International Law, International Law in Ferment and the World
Court: A Discussion on the Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, 94 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 172, 174 (2000) (recognizing, according to a former judge and several practitio-
ners, the justice of such a characterization).
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assert the jurisdiction, and the Court went to some lengths to do
that.
270
The WTO adjudicative bodies are likewise asserting themselves, as
discussed in Part I. Given the evolution of their own courts, lawyers from
both sides of the Atlantic will be comfortable with this trend. Indeed,
those in tune with global goals will be quite happy with it.
Another aspect of the civil law system that will assuage the civil law
mind when confronted with activist global tribunals is the civil law's own
use of courts technically outside the judiciary for tasks that require
broader discretion. The French Council of State was created to review
legislative and other government action. Since the Council was not part of
the judiciary, it could engage in aggressive policy-oriented review27' Most
civil law nations have separate administrative courts to insulate their
regular courts from involvement with the government. 21 2 Civil law sys-
tems have also established constitutional courts rather than authorize the
"judiciary" to review legislation.2 These courts are not considered part of
the judiciary, and hence, may engage in review of legislation consistent
with civil law ideology. Through these courts, the civil law culture has
become accustomed to judicial review, and those from civil law cultures
will have fewer problems with global "courts" exercising functions tradi-
tionally prohibited to the civil law judiciary.
There remains a distinction between how the civil and common law
envision the judicial role in society. Common law judges are lawmakers,
and hence, it is natural to conceive that common law judges have greater
authority. It is certainly true that, in the aggregate, they are expected to
evolve the law. Therefore, as an institution, a common law judiciary
seems to have a more important social role than that of a civil law judici-
ary. The common law judiciary has more status in the system, as well.
This status is enhanced in the legal community by the fact that common
law judges come to the bench as successful members of the practicing
bar. It is not difficult to see why both judges and the bar constantly press
for a common law conception of the judicial role. Experience with mixed
systems, those combining common law and civil law elements, suggests
270. Id. at 175. Those unfamiliar with the ICJ should understand that the Registrar is an
extremely important official. They head a staff that prepares the case for trial, and drafts judg-
ments, advisory opinions, and orders. They also check these documents before they are issued
by the Court, as well as assist the judges much as law clerks assist U.S. judges. See ROSENNE,
supra note 19, at 442.
271. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAw
WORLD 11 (1954) ("[The Council of State's] decisions were swayed just as much by policy as
by law."). Many civil law systems borrowed the council of state model but have now removed
the adjudicative function.
272. WATKIN, supra note 81, at 370-71.
273. Louis FAVOREU, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 6 (2001).
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that global tribunals and their bars will attempt to assert authority for their
law-making powers using common law arguments.274
As the two legal cultures conceive of a global judiciary, the source of
authority in individual cases will also create a basis for contention. Civil
law judges have discretion in deciding their cases, but the source of that
discretion differs from the common law. In the civil law system, a court
must find some delegation, sometimes implied, to do equity.275 In contrast,
a common law judge has inherent authority derived from the separate eq-
uity tradition.276 Since civil law judges interpret their authority to do
equity, they might seem to have similar authority. But the nature of the
distinction between the two cannot be ignored. On the world stage, civil
law and common law lawyers and judges will be skeptical of each other's
approach to equity authorization. Civil law judges and lawyers will argue
authority based on some delegation, whereas common law judges and
lawyers will assume that global judges will have inherent authority to
consider individual fairness where they see fit. Both because civil law
lawyers predominate and because assumptions of discretion, even to do
individual fairness, are suspect, global legal culture will probably more
closely resemble the civil law approach. Nonetheless, U.S. lawyers are
not unarmed. Their administrative and constitutional law is rich with
delegation jurisprudence.
The two transatlantic legal cultures differ in the operation of their ju-
dicial hierarchy. While there is no established global hierarchy, rulings of
the ICJ are usually given great deference by other supranational tribunals.
However, a similar tendency is not apparent regarding trade. The WTO
Appellate Body's pronouncements seem to hold no particular weight in
other supranational trade tribunals. Rights tribunals do not feel bound by
ICJ law either.277 This situation not only affects the nature of precedent, as
described above, but it weakens the overall concept of a global judiciary.
U.S. lawyers will favor a unified hierarchical judicial regime. They are
accustomed to one Supreme Court of ultimate authority. More basically,
the common law system of judicial law making requires an ultimate judi-
cial authority, but the civil law system does not need such a final judicial
authority.
274. PALMER, supra note 77, at 35-36.
275. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 52-53.
276. Id. at 51-52.
277. "There is no hierarchy of courts with predetermined jurisdiction. Instead there exists
a more complex and haphazard multiplicity of courts, with no pretense of schematic hierarchy
between them." ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 529. On the other hand: "While there is no formal
hierarchy of international courts and tribunals, the pre-eminence of ... the present International
Court is today generally accepted. Any other international adjudicatory body which ignored
relevant dicta and decisions of the International Court would jeopardize its credibility." Id. at
1609.
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U.S. lawyers are likely to press the system to form a unified global
judicial regime. Europeans, on the other hand, are more accustomed to
separate court systems, and might not be as anxious to unify the courts. 2 9
The several global tribunals might have and could still form into a unified
judicial regime, but civilians will not have the instinct to do so in a way
that may well drive U.S. lawyers .2 " They will see the WTO judiciary and
the ICJ as founded on two very distinct governmental institutions whose
"competences" should be kept separate. The need for different expertise is
283
one of the forces that has kept supranational tribunals separate.
Europeans and Americans differ on the use of specialized court sys-
tems. Europeans are more familiar to separate court systems. The French
have the Cassation, the final court for general law, and the Council of
State, the final court for administrative law, along with a separate consti-
tutional council.282 The Germans have five separate court systems and a
Constitutional Court. A constitutional court, separate from those that han-
281
dle regular legal issues, is the norm in civil law countries. In the
European supranational regime, the ECJ has jurisdiction over trade and
the ECHR has jurisdiction over rights enforcement. The CFI provides
another E.U. example of the continental European tendency to create spe-
cialist courts.
Still, a unified system would no doubt provide coherence in the de-
velopment of global law, and coherence is essential to legitimacy. Indeed,
the E.U. could be used as a counter-example to the civil law tendency
toward establishing specialist courts. The ECJ, in the exercise of its trade
jurisdiction, has taken on many rights-enforcement questions, and it
would take little technical effort to shift jurisdiction over issues of rights
into that court and create a supreme court of Europe. International law has
278. Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 171 ("Given the disastrous consequences that incoherence
could have on the international judicial system, it is time to abandon the orthodoxy and insist on
the formalization of the relationships between tribunals.").
279. See id. at 153-54.
280. Jackson observed that the precursor to the WTO, the International Trade Organiza-
tion, would have had appeals to the "World Court," or in other words, the ICJ. John H. Jackson,
Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, in FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 68-69 (2000).
281. Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 149.
282. Had the "star chamber" survived, it might have evolved into something like the
French Council of State, and the common law world might have become accustom to a dual
judicial system as well. Though vilified in history, that review body was a casualty of politics,
not principles. LAWRENCE BAXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20 (1984) (pointing out that the Star
Chamber was "fairly popular with the public" but "[c]ommon lawyers considered the court a
threat to the jurisdiction of King's Bench.").
283. WATKIN, supra note 81, at 6 ("Another hallmark of civil law systems therefore is
their possession of a constitutional court or some such body to hear and determine [whether a
particular piece of legislation offends against the fundamental law of the State].").
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never had a unified system.28 Nonetheless, the proliferation of global and
supranational tribunals is increasingly creating incoherent and sometimes
contradictory principles.285 Consistency and certainty suffer, so that in the
end the U.S. legal view may have the strongest practical case.
E. Procedure
Much of the tension in the emerging global legal culture will revolve
around procedural principles. Tension will arise at the theoretical level
because procedural principles express a legal culture's understanding of
fundamental fairness, making alien ideas about process inherently sus-
pect. Practicalities also fuel this tension because practical lawyers will
feel disadvantaged by unfamiliar procedural designs.
A significant gulf exists between the common law "adversarial"
model and the civil law "inquisitorial" model. The common law lawyer
has been traumatized by the "star chamber" horror story ever since the
English judges helped parliament triumph over the executive-monarch.
The very term "inquisitorial" calls up these horrible images. On the other
hand, much about the adversarial model offends fundamental instincts
among civil lawyers as well. In fact, these terms do not capture the true
difference between the two models. The overarching contrast is the rela-
tive position of lawyers and judges. Civil processes are adversarial in their
own way, and one would hope that the common law process aims at in-
quiring into the truth. They differ in the techniques employed to assure
participation and discovery of the truth.
The judge-managed process of the civil law has advantages in assur-
ing equality of opportunity. As described above, once the parties have
brought a case to court, the court assumes responsibility for the effective
216handling of the case. In contrast, common law pleadings merely get theplaintiff into the courthouse. The lawyers must then develop the case and
284. See Jonathan Chamey, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settle-
ment Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 74 (1996)
(noting that the ICJ, and the PCIJ before it, promoted the rule of law "in the context of a mixed
system that allows for a variety of other forums to decide matters of international law.");
Carl-August Fleischbauer, The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the
Newly Created International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L. 327, 333 (1997) (discussing how the ICJ and the Hamburg Tribunal will divide interna-
tional legal cases and labor).
285. See Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 159-68 (discussing the conflicting views of the ICJ
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia regarding state responsibility
for acts of state officials). While the ICTY trial level court applied the ICJ precedent, the appel-
late body explicitly refused to apply ICJ law. Id. at 167-68.
286. Issues and evidence, however, are still controlled by the parties. See MERRYMAN,
supra note 102, at 111-23.
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build the record, with the judges acting more like referees. The informa-
tion that becomes the record will be validated during trial . 7
The role of the trial itself is quite different between the two systems.
A common law trial is the end product; all the real work is done at trial,
and everything else is preparatory. In contrast, the civil law depends on a
process, with the trial some part of that process. It is not usually the
dominant part, except when the final decision is made.
The civil law depends much more on writing. The common law dis-
trusts written proceedings.2 11 Its oral orientation requires writing to be
converted essentially into testimony and validated by admission at trial
under specific rules of admissibility. In short, the relative competence of
the parties' lawyers determines the effectiveness and equality of opportu-
nity in the common law process, whereas the civil law process focuses
more on a sense of fairness and the sensitivity of its judges.
The civil law's focus on judge control is in many aspects more ap-
propriate to the global tribunals. Judicial control assures that the court
itself has an adequate record. Civil law procedures allow the court to
consult experts, including legal experts, more readily. The adversarial
process would require most experts to appear as witnesses, and hence
limiting their usefulness to the court. Section II.C. describes the ECJ's
incorporation of the preparatory judge and the judicial advisor. In that
court, the case is assigned to a "judge-reporter" who prepares the docket,
while the court relies upon the legal advice of an "advocate general" who
287. Thibaut and Walker, in their empirical study of the two, found that institutionalization
of either the adversarial process or its continental rival have an affect on the type of facts pre-
sented to fact finders. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 39-40 (1975). They demonstrated that the "inquisitorial" process
used on the continent has disadvantages in confronting sampling error. "However, this study has
identified a major, and heretofore unsuspected, effect of adversary decision making: the model
introduces a systematic evidentiary bias in favor of the party disadvantaged by the discovered
facts." Id. at 40. That is, the adversary process creates an incorrect view of the balance of infor-
mation where the weight of the evidence clearly rests on one side of the controversy. On the
other hand, another process may create other accuracy biases, as does the "inquisitorial" model.
The fundamental procedural choice is actually based on the "brand" of inaccuracy preferred in
the legal culture. In general, the U.S. system of procedural design is committed to the adversar-
ial process because it focuses on the quality rather than the quantity of the evidence.
288. However, increased use of written materials may be making its way into English
courts. See T.H. Bingham, "There Is a World Elsewhere?": The Changing Perspectives of Eng-
lish Law, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. (1992) 513, 526 ("[11f a judge of (say) the immediate
post-war period were to return to the courts today, whether at first instance or on appeal, he
would feel himself to be in an environment that would feel quite strange and, as he might think,
un-English.").
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prepares a thorough legal analysis.289 The Court may order expert reports
under the supervision of the judge-reporter.90
These aspects of the inquisitorial model will offend common lawyers
who are used to having greater control of their cases. Understandably,
lawyers prefer the common law procedure in which they are dominant.
Empirical evidence suggests that the judge-controlled process is less sat-
isfactory to ordinary citizens as well.9 Yet, great diversity within the
judiciary argues in favor of helper judges. In addition, the unequal quality
of representation among participants in global litigation will be mitigated
by the ability of the court to control the record. Given the even greater
likely disparity in the resources available to litigants in global adjudica-
tions, the civil law use of court experts, rather than the common law's
insistence that experts appear for the litigants as witnesses, surely will
enhance the technical competence and equality of judicial deci-
sion-making.
Process in the two systems may also conflict at the appellate level. In
contrast to the U.S. inclination, the civil law empowers appellate courts to
289. KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION § 1-011
(1999).
290. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, art. 49,
1991 O.J. (L 176) 7, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/txtdocfr/main.htm.
291. However, Thibaut and Walker, in their empirical study of the two process models,
provided an in-depth empirical examination into the factors that ensure satisfaction in a legal
process. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 287, at 1-5; see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of
Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 750-60 (1976). Thibaut and Walker
compared the so-called "adversary" process, the passive decision-maker model, with its conti-
nental rival, the active decision-maker model unfortunately termed "inquisitory" process. They
found that: "One of the most intriguing findings for participant subjects was the linear increase
in satisfaction with the procedure, perceived fairness of the procedure, and opportunity for evi-
dence presentation as the procedural mode moved along the continuum from the inquisitorial to
the choice adversary method." THIBAUT & WALKER, supra, at 94. Other studies have confirmed
this finding in various settings. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 211-14 (1988). Uninvolved observers and continental subjects (those not
habituated to the adversarial process) showed a similar preference for the adversary process. See
THIBAUT & WALKER, supra, at 77-80. This satisfaction emanates from leveling, even though it
distorts the true balance of factual support for one of the positions. Id. at 77. Also, they found
that "subjects are more willing to trust an adversary system than an inquisitorial attorney to
produce accurate, unbiased judgments." Id. (emphasis in the original). That is, participants and
observers were impressed by the adversarial model's restraints on the conduct of the decision
makers.
292. The limitation of certain types of expert evidence in VTO panels has caused some
controversy. While statutes confirm that the panels have broad authority to investigate and
evaluate the facts in each case, WTO Appellate Body decisions indicate that some evidence is
now limited to the explanations and evaluations of the evidence provided by the parties. Joost
Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 354
(2002) ("It unduly restricts the inquisitorial role of WTO panels as international tribunals and
constitutes an unwarranted transplantation of common law principles into the WTO process.")
(emphasis added).
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engage in de novo review.2 93 This may be a natural extension of the choice
of judicial control versus lawyer control. Since the parties are responsible
for the common law record, it is natural that the courts should accept
"their" record. Whereas, since the judiciary is responsible for the civil law
record, it is natural that each level of the court system should check on the
record, as well as the application of the law to the record. Regardless,
civil law and common law practitioners will have very different expecta-
tions at the appellate level as well as the "trial" level. Perhaps because of
U.S. influence, global tribunals with appellate authority are limited to
questions of law.194 Because of the complexity of fact-finding in global
disputes, this common law-type appellate review might be best solution.
Lawyers and jurists from the two systems might disagree about the
function of reviewing courts in any global judicial hierarchy. Based on the
French model, the highest courts in civil law systems are likely to be
courts of "cassation." Cassation means that the reviewing court may
"quash" a lower court decision it finds to be incorrect, but may not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the lower court.9 The reviewing court is
limited to returning the case for reconsideration. Common law practitio-
ners will expect global courts to conduct appeals. Experience with mixed
civil and common law systems show a natural tendency for courts to
evolve into courts of appeal. 96
The procedures for supervision of state courts by a central judiciary
will be another source of tension. U.S. lawyers are likely to be shocked by
some ideas that might come out of the E.U. procedures. In the U.S., the
Supreme Court may only review state decisions involving federal issues
that have been addressed by the highest state court. The E.U. has a "pre-
liminary ruling mechanism" that allows any member tribunal, no matter
how lowly, to refer E.U. questions directly to the ECJ.2 97 A former presi-
dent of the ICJ has recommended that a similar mechanism be available
so that national courts may refer international questions directly to the
ICJ.291 U.S. lawyers will be very uncomfortable with such an approach.
Of course, questions of procedural design have already been ad-
dressed in the global arena. Where the U.S. participates, the U.S. has had
293. See generally VRANKEN, supra note 79.
294. The WTO is a good example. Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, New Direc-
tions in International Trade Law: WTO Dispute Settlement, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 31 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998); Terence P.
Stewart & Amy S. Dwyer, HANDBOOK ON WTO TRADE REMEDY DISPUTES: THE FIRST SIX
YEARS (1995-2000) 2 (2001).
295. ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 86 (2d ed. 1998).
296. PALMER, supra note 77, at 39 (discussing the evolution of the Puerto Rican Supreme
Court from a classic cassational style to a court of appeals).
297. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 234 (ex art. 177).
298. American Society of International Law, supra note 269, at 181.
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its way on procedural issues. The U.S. has been able to insist on adver-
sarial-type hearings. As more and more "regular," non-international
practitioners find themselves engaged in these global tribunals, the ten-
sion will increase. Civil law lawyers may be less accepting of common
law processes. And common law practitioners may begin to recognize
that non-practitioners have been willing to trade substantive principles for
process. In short, the current detente on procedure, such as it is, may not
be as stable as it seems.299
F. Impact of Non-Judicial Institutions
Not directly related to conflict between the civil law and common law
systems as such, but nonetheless equally important to anticipating global
judicial regimes, is the contrast in the judiciary's overall position in gov-
ernment between a parliamentary system and a presidential system. The
different principles behind the position of the judiciary in these two gov-
ernmental models will reach into the global legal culture. Here, the U.S.
will diverge from even its common law partners.
The U.S. version of separation of powers structurally divides the two
political functions into the legislative and executive governmental
branches. In the parliamentary system, the executive, or "government," is
the leadership of the legislative. An informal separation exists between
the 'ins' and the 'outs', rather than an institutional separation between
legislative and executive actors as in the presidential system. Not only
will the outs include the minority parties in the legislature, but also the
non-leadership "backbenchers" of the controlling party or parties. The
key separation in the parliamentary system then is between the
democratic institutions of government and the judiciary. The
parliamentary system reinforces the civil law conception of the role of the
courts in which the courts have a specially-defined function regarding
litigation with the government, often to guarantee that courts do not
interfere in the business of government. But even common law
parliamentary systems ensure separation between the political branches
and the judiciary. England, the font of the common law, evidences the
299. Jackson criticizes the WTO/GATT dispute settlement structure for its ossification of
procedure. As many as 80 changes, most involving "fine tuning," have been proposed. The De-
cision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/
53-ddsv.pdf, calls for a review of procedures. Jackson notes: "One of the geniuses of GAT7"...
was its ability to evolve partly through trial and error and practice." Jackson, supra note 280, at
77. In contrast, he observed constraints on a similar evolutionary process regarding procedures.
Id. Surely, there is value in stabilizing procedures because of the number and diversity of par-
ticipants with various resources. Still, creating a judicial regime for the whole world should
justify a good deal of new thinking and experimentation. Of course this may be a mere expres-
sion of an U.S. lawyer's obsession with procedure.
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long struggle between an elite judiciary and a representative parliament,
which justified creation of a "parliamentary sovereignty."' °
On the other hand, the presidential model empowers the judiciary.
Separation of the executive from the legislative branch in the presidential
system puts the courts in the position of arbiter between the two political
branches. Thus, the presidential model enhances judicial authority be-
cause the judiciary is the ultimate institution to mediate between the
executive and the legislature. Because most parliamentary systems com-
bine control of the two political functions, the judiciary is weakened by its
position of second-guessing the majoritarian institutions of government.
It is difficult to predict how separation of powers theory will play out
in the global community. The E.U. has evolved closer to a U.S. separation
of powers system, even though it consists of countries with a parliamen-
tary system.3 °' Perhaps there is a natural tendency in the direction of the
U.S. view that will play out in the global arena. One useful global ex-
perience is the Lockerbie case discussed above. 0 2 The case involved
Libya's resistance to U.S. and U.K. efforts to extradite those who planted
the bomb that caused the crash over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya filed its
case with the ICJ in conflict with a U.N. Security Council decision. The
ICJ's resolution of the conflict established that both the Council and the
Court have certain quasi-judicial functions.3 3 Nonetheless, the Court
made it clear that, while it is bound to cooperate with the other "principle
organs," the ICJ is equally bound by considerations of international law'0
On the other hand, its decision-making may not be confined to such con-
siderations.0 5 While the ICJ ducked a direct confrontation with the
Council by applying a separation of powers-related concept similar to the
U.S. "political question" doctrine, it asserted its own authority to review
non-judicial institutions.
300. WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 72, at 29. In addition:
The sovereignty of Parliament is a peculiar feature of the British constitution which
exerts a constant and powerful influence. In particular, it is an ever-present threat to
the position of the courts; and it naturally inclines the judges towards caution in their
attitude to the executive, since Parliament is effectively under the executive's control.
Id.
301. See Bignami, supra note 93, at 468-69.
302. Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14).
303. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice
and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.643, 661 (1994).
304. Id. at 674.
305. ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 118 ("[W]hile the Court's task is limited to functions of a
legal character, its power of action and decision is subject to no limitation deriving from the fact
that the dispute before it might also be part of a dispute which is within the competence of some
other organ.").
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The distinctions of the two governmental models also affect judicial
authority over administrative acts. Legislative and administrative acts are
more clearly distinguished in the presidential model, and hence courts
have been able to assume significant authority. Similar action in parlia-
mentary systems is evidence of another type of legislation-making
judicial assertion of authority that is antidemocratic, rather than protective
of the citizenry.3 6The very terms used to describe administrative func-
tioning express the great gulf between judicial treatment in the two
systems. In the U.S., it is called 'rulemaking,' and in the parliamentary
system it is called 'delegated legislation,' or subordinate legislation.
Delegated legislation, as administrative pronouncements delegated to the
government-part of the legislature, properly takes on the aspects of legis-
lation. From a judicial review perspective, they are much the same as
legislation. In the U.S., such administrative pronouncements are concep-
tually distinct from the legislation which they are intended to
307implement. Pronouncements made pursuant to delegated authority, or
"legislative rules," have special force, even though not classified as actual
legislation.0 8
The E.U. experience, leaning more toward separation of powers than
its parliamentary members, suggests that a global legal regime will in-
clude administrative "legislation" more akin to the U.S. mode.° The
306. It seems consistent that administrative interpretations have less force in civil law
systems than in a U.S. common law system. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 269.
307. Another manifestation of the separation between the judicial and political institutions
in civil law is the careful distinction between public law and private law. U.S. law is not without
this dichotomy, but it is not as grounded as it is under the civil law. Indeed, these categories go
back to Roman law. In the U.S., the government is not "protected" by separate courts. Not only
is the government subjected to oversight by generalist courts, but U.S. thinking is that such a
system is necessary. Remember, the U.S. believes that the judiciary is the least dangerous
branch. However, review of government decisions by generalist judges is suspect, and hence
limited by several doctrines, e.g., political question, of administrative law.
308. In our system, the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States (HTSUS) must
be characterized as legislative rules. HTSUS are "recommended" by the International Trade
Commission, and issued by presidential decree. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3004-3006 (2002). They are in-
corporated by reference into the statute itself. 19 U.S.C. § 1202. It is most nearly our system's
equivalent to "delegated legislation" as found in a parliamentary system. Delegated legislation is
literally legislation made by the executive, which is part of the legislature. See, e.g., WADE &
FORSYTH, supra note 72, at 859. In our system, however, where the legislative and the executive
are constitutionally separate, Congress cannot delegate actual legislative authority, and hence
rulemaking may not be considered "legislation." Thus, the HTSUS must be seen as legislative
rules made pursuant to delegated authority. See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304-06, 99 S.
Ct. 1705 (1979) (inquiring into whether an executive order represents sufficient delegation to be
considered "law").
309. The dominant procedural requirements for E.U. "secondary legislation," or rulemak-
ing, were established by the "Comitology" decisions. The Commission may adopt rules under
the indirect control of the Council. Control is indirect because a committee of Member State
experts is charged with day-to-day supervision of Commission rulemaking. The second Comi-
tology decision gave parliament power similar to legislative veto. Council Decision
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E.U., however, represents more of a middle ground between the presiden-
tial and parliamentary models. The U.S. will view administrative
pronouncements as lacking legislative-like weight, but E.U. adherents
might see it as "secondary legislation." The former will carry the author-
ity of an executive interpretation of a statute. The latter, to some extent,
will carry the authority of the legislature itself. These characterizations
will substantially affect judicial freedom in the face of such pronounce-
ments.
Differences in separation of powers ideology can also affect judicial
participation in the legislative process itself. Advisory judicial opinions
are more readily accepted in continental European systems than in the
U.S."0 Europeans are likely to push for an advisory role for global tribu-
nals or for tribunals designed for that purpose, replicating the
constitutional courts. French President Jacques Chirac advocated that the
ICJ be invested with a "regulatory role, advising international organiza-
tions with advisory opinions requested to reconcile in cases where the
international law of environment, trade, and labor standards conflict."3"'
U.S. courts are constitutionally prohibited from issuing advisory opin-
ions . 2 In contrast, the constitutional courts of many nations regularly
engage in advisory opinions."' Legislators are often specifically author-
ized to take legislation to the constitutional court. Legislative standing in
the U.S., in contrast, is not permitted.34 The ECJ has expressed jurisdic-
tion over parliamentary actions against the other E.U. institutions. The
two approaches to judicial advice might be hard to reconcile, but the U.S.
might accept the continental approach because its prohibition is based on
the constitutional language and not the rationality of the concept.
G. Qualification and Selection of Global Judges
Another sensitive aspect of the global judicial regime will be the
mundane question of judicial selection and qualification. The tension
1999/468/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23. See Christoph Demmke et al., The History of Comitology,
in SHAPING EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY: THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES AND COMITOLOGY IN
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 61 (Robin H. Pedler & Guenther F. Schaefer eds., 1996); Ellen Vos,
The Rise of Committees, 3 EUR. L.J. 210 (1997). Generally, rules involving significant norma-
tive choices require more procedures than those involving routine administrative matters.
310. See HELFER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 312-14.
311. Speech of Jacques Chirac, quoted in American Society of International Law, supra
note 269, at 180.
312. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (6th ed. 1995).
313. FAVOREU, supra note 273, at 22-23 (noting, however, that the extent to which con-
stitutional courts engage in a priori review is decreasing).
314. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) ("'Mere would be nothing irrational about a
system which granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate
under one or another variant of such a regime .... But it is obviously not the regime that has
obtained under our Constitution to date.").
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between the common law view of the nature of the judiciary and that of
the civil law goes deeper than conflict over representation and
professional qualifications. Common law judges are amateur judges. That
is, they are not trained or apprenticed as judges, and are selected from
among practicing lawyers. As discussed above, civil law judges are
trained as judges, and they move up a hierarchy as they prove themselves
at lower levels. They are products of a judicial bureaucracy, "faceless
bureaucrats."35 Common lawyers are likely to be appalled by such judges,
just as civil law lawyers are likely to be appalled by the lack of training
and experience of common law judges.
16
The two selection regimes no doubt change the actual judicial deci-
sion-making. For one thing, common law judges, coming from the same
fraternity, find practitioner judges more acceptable. Studies show that
practicing lawyers, not surprisingly, bring their practice perspective with
them to the bench."' Civil lawyers might find that this tendency detracts
from the integrity and impartiality of judicial decision-making. Common
lawyers may find that civil law judges lack the touch of reality, and have
the propensity to over-conceptualize. Yet, civil law judges have their own
brand of experience-experience at being judges. Representatives of
those systems may be forgiven for believing that that experience is supe-
rior and less likely to create bias.
315. Civil law opinions are collegial; they are the opinion of the court. Common law
judges identify themselves. Common law lawyers are accustomed to working with the identity
of judges, not just appellate judges. There are good and bad justifications of both, but there is
certainly a choice which might be rectified intellectually, albeit more difficult to satisfy practi-
tioners. At present, the WTO appellate tribunal does not identify the individual judicial views.
Jackson, supra note 280, at 71 ("There is no indication of particular authorship of any part of an
Appellate Body report and no provision for dissenting opinions."). However, a recent WTO
Appellate Body decision may suggest that this is changing. In the Asbestos case, one of the
panelists wrote a concurring opinion, changing the long-standing practice to write unanimous
opinions. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS I 35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). The ECHR,
however, is an example of a supranational judicial body that does allow for both dissenting and
concurring opinions. Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 51(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
316. Lord Goff discusses the quality of common law judges, stating that it is experience
that counts most in common law systems. The essential quality of the judge then is not knowl-
edge, but wisdom. Goff, supra note 103, at 755. Mixed common-civil law jurisdictions suggest
a natural tendency toward selecting experienced practitioners where the civil law tradition of
specialized training is not in place, choosing experience over education. See PALMER, supra note
77, at 37.
317. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1470 (1998) ("Although we initially
shared [skepticism about the impact of prior employment], our study found nearly every prior
employment variable of these judges, with the exceptions of law professor and political experi-
ence (and perhaps prosecutorial experience), to be significant in some manner.").
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The European judicial selection was made flexible in order to ac-
commodate its common law members' judicial traditions. With the U.K.
and Ireland, prominent members of the European community, qualifica-
tion of European judges had to accommodate the difference between
common law and civil law judicial selection. Thus, candidates for both
the ECJ and ECHR must satisfy alternative qualifications.1 8 Candidates
qualify under the agreements either as qualified for judicial appointment
in the national court or as those "who are jurisconsults of recognized
competence."3 9 These criteria recognize scholarship as a qualification for
judges in accord with civil law respect for jurists, as well as the common
law insistence on practical legal experience and reputation.
A similar divide can be expected, as global tribunals become more
court-like. Qualification for membership on the ICJ offers a similar com-
promise. Judges are qualified if they have "qualification required in their
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial office, or are
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law."3 20 Indeed,
other alternatives might be contemplated to satisfy other legal cultures.
Characteristics of the adjudicators functioning in the WTO dispute
process reflect more the political, negotiation character of the process
than a true adjudicative character. The initial or "trial" level proceeding is
conducted by "Dispute Panels," the qualifications for which is prior ser-
vice on or representation during a panel, previous employ as a
government representative under GATT, employ as a Secretariat expert,
having a scholarly record in international trade law or policy, or having
served as a Member's senior trade policy official.321 Members of the Ap-
pellate Body must have recognized standing in international law or trade.
To some extent the acceptance of scholarly background leans more to-
wards the civil law approach. But in the end, the WTO bodies are not
currently peopled by judicial types under either legal culture. Thus, if
these bodies become more court-like in operation, the question of selec-
tion and qualification of real judicial officials will have to satisfy those
318. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 49-50 (5th ed. 2000).
319. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 223 (ex art.
167), O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997).
320. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1055,
1055, 3 Bevans 1179, 1179, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). See
also ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 397 (criticizing the order in which these two alternatives are
written, because experience at the highest domestic judicial office does not assure expertise in
international law).
321. KONSTANTINOS ADAMANTOPOULOS, AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION 61-62 (1997); see also DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 68-69 (1999).
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from both legal cultures. Again, the "judicial" nature of the adjudicators
may be a characteristic that must satisfy diverse legal cultures.
Perceptions of the necessary characteristics for independence are also
likely areas of tension. The U.S. is strongly committed to the value of life
tenure. The E.U., true to its civil law roots, believes that a term of years is
in fact the best way to assure independence.3 22 It is very unlikely that
global tribunals will ever have life tenure judges, for reasons that are more
political than choosing the legal system. The best chance for judicial in-
dependence will be prohibition against reappointment.
Another independence issue, although not necessarily to pit transat-
lantic participants against each other, is national representation in
supranational judicial bodies. Because of Congressional participation in
the selection of federal judges, U.S. federal courts generally have local
representation. In the E.U., all its institutions, parliament, commission,
council, and the courts, explicitly incorporate Member State identity. The
ECJ, as a practical matter, assures representation from each member.
3 23
The E.U. itself, however, recognizes that it must change in light of expan-
sion.324
At present, and in any foreseeable future, global tribunals will be sen-
sitive to national or regional representation. However, real equality of
representation is impossible because of the size of the world community.
What must replace national representation is sensitivity to representation
from various legal cultures. The ICJ has adopted this approach. Article 9
provides:
At every election, the electors [UN members] shall bear in mind
not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess
the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the
principal legal systems of the world should be assured.325
This must certainly be a difficult judgment, but a necessary spirit.
326
322. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 223 (ex art. 167) ("The Judges ... shall be ap-
pointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States for a term of six years.").
323. Brown & Kennedy, supra note 318, at 48 (explaining that it is not required, but since
each member must agree on an appointment, states will insist on representation).
324. Alan Dashwood, The Constitution of the European Union After Nice: Law-Making
Procedures, 26 EUR. L. REV. 215, 216 (2001); Jan Wouters, Institutional and Constitutional
Challenges for the European Union-Some Reflections in the Light of the Treaty of Nice, 26 EUR.
L. REV. 342, 343 (2001) (criticizing, unfairly in light of recent events, the Nice Intergovern-
mental Conference for not contemplating reforms beyond those needed for expansion).
325. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 320, art. 9. See also SHABTAI
ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 54-62 (5th ed. 1995).
326. One possibility is the well-recognized comparative law groups called "legal fami-
lies." DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 110, at 17-20. As discussed in Section uHF., these legal
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H. Legal Representation Before Global Tribunals
In the end, the practice of law gives substance and reality to the rule
of law. Its success will be determined by the successful merger of princi-
ples and theory, which separate legal representation around the world.
Until recently, the practice of law has been largely a local or, at most, a
national enterprise, and implementation of the rule of law has struggled
within many isolated venues. In our emerging global society, a coherent
vision of the rule of law becomes an imperative. Hence, insulated legal
practices are no longer acceptable.
The practice of law in the world's legal systems can be quite differ-
ent. Indeed, culture may have more to do with the practice of law than
legal theory. Global practice will witness diversity among the various
cultures of the world, even those adopting one of the transatlantic models.
Whereas this Article notes some major ideological distinctions between
two major legal cultures, the practice of law among common law systems
varies greatly, as does the practice of law among civil law systems. Even
at their base, civil law systems differ among themselves. For example,
French civil law was intended to make lawyers unnecessary, and even
though it does not accomplish that, its legal culture is influenced by that
philosophy. German law seeks to provide legal certainty and faithfulness
to the past.31 7 Law as practiced in the U.S. differs substantially from prac-
tice in England and Ireland. In short, the style and nature of representation
in the global arena will experience clashes of multiple cultures, even
within the larger categories of civil and common law.
Faithfulness to language in authoritative documents will be a major
area of tension. The degree of attention common and civil law representa-
tives pay to language is likely to differ. As discussed, statutory language
can no more be ignored in the common law systems, even in the U.S.,
than in the civil law systems. In the end, a court must obey statutory lan-
guage in either system. Nonetheless, U.S. representatives must be
prepared to argue from authoritative language in a way that seems some-
what literal and repressed to them. On the other hand, civil law advocates
may find themselves somewhat freed by their association with common
law representatives. They might find themselves plumbing new ap-
proaches to language. Indeed, this experience might support the
movement in the civil law away from the grammatical approach, and it
may give more credence to a certain degree of formalism in U.S. juris-
prudence.
families may offer a device whereby the global legal culture may coordinate the various world
legal cultures. See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 83, at 63-73.
327. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 31-32.
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The treatment of case law is the second major area of tension that will
affect representation. Most likely, as justified above, precedent will have
force in the global legal culture, but will never attain the binding effect it
has in common law jurisprudence. As discussed, precedent does influence
civil law, so that the difference between systems is really one of degree.
Supranational tribunals seem inclined to value precedent, and the dynam-
ics of creating a global legal culture itself demands reference to prior
judicial treatment. Legal historians explain that case authority depended
historically on the availability of judicial opinions in England." 8 Since the
cases were available, common law lawyers and judges naturally used
them in support of their positions, especially in the power grab of the
formative years. 329 This experience suggests that the readily available re-
ports of the decisions of global tribunals will necessarily lead to a more
precedent-oriented advocacy in the global legal culture. Rosenne said of
the ICJ, "The constant accretion of judicial precedents is creating what is
now a substantial body of international case-law."33 Representatives will
naturally refer to prior decisions in support of their positions, even if
those decisions have no formal stare decisis effect. It will be hard for
lower level tribunals to ignore related decisions by appeals tribunals.
Similarly, appeals tribunals will find it difficult to avoid their own prior
decisions. Add the common law practitioners' inclination to use prior au-
thority and it can be predicted that a case-oriented representation and
judicial decision-making will become part of the global legal culture.
The common law glorifies lawyers and gives them ultimate control
over the law. Judges are practitioners who see legal representation from
the perspective of practicing lawyers. Legal analysis then will also differ
depending on the sources considered to be the best authority. Civilians
can be expected to advocate from scholarly works with more force than
common law advocates. As noted above, in the civil law, scholars actually
propound the law, whereas in common law, scholarship seeks to explain
and influence the law made by judges."' In practice, however, lawyers in
lower courts rarely cite jurists, even in civil law systems.3 The real ten-
sion will come when civil lawyers expect their jurists to have compelling
328. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552-1634) 507 (1956) ("Even Francis Bacon acknowledged it.
'Had it not been for Sir Edward Coke's Reports... the law by this time had been almost like a
ship without ballast, for that the cases of modem experience are fled from those that are ad-
judged and ruled in former time.' ").
329. See generally COKE, supra note 192.
330. ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 1609.
331. See GLENN, supra note 90, at 227 (describing the emergence of "judges actually
making law (and binding law at that).").
332. See LAWSON, supra note 120, at 84 ("I have heard advocates say that they rarely cite
the views of jurists before any court lower than the Cour de Cassation...").
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force at the "appellate," or law-developing, stage. They will expect
scholars to have significant practical impact, and representatives from
other cultures, e.g., an Islamic legal culture, will also give special weight
to the work of legal scholars. Even in the common law, scholars have
considerable weight in appellate decisions. Again, the difference is one of
degree and form.
Each group of representatives will rely on familiar techniques, and
will incorporate familiar strategies. On the other hand, representatives
will make the best arguments they can. Therefore, global practice will
find common law advocates arguing from authoritative language as well
as jurists' comments, and civil law advocates arguing from judicial opin-
ions and a balancing of interests approach. Global judges will likely find
themselves justifying their decisions in similarly flexible ways. In short,
the global practice of law will borrow from all cultures. That does not
diminish the overarching premise of this Article: that the subtle differ-
ences among legal cultures must be understood as their representatives
engage in the process of fashioning a global legal culture.
CONCLUSION
Globalization will necessarily lead to an ever-stronger union of con-
stituent states under an increasingly empowered supranational
government. Judicial institutions will develop in this government. Global
tribunals will become increasingly more like courts over the years. This
prediction is relatively easy because the evolutionary process is already
moving well along. The exact contours of the judicial institution are still
to be determined, but the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, combined with
the human rights adjudicators of the ICJ, provide very viable
first-generation antecedents.
Envisioning the legal culture that will emerge from these suprana-
tional tribunals is more problematic. This Article has attempted to provide
the framework for projecting the evolution of the global legal culture. Its
major subtext is the practical necessity for U.S. readers to learn about the
world's legal cultures, starting with the often quite unfamiliar ideologies
and practices of the continental European systems. It observes that the
two dominant legal cultures in the world are now the civil law system and
the common law system. Together they form at least a significant com-
ponent of 62% of the world's jurisdictions, covering 70% of its
population. To add some coherence, the U.S. is cast as the major common
law system, and the E.U. represents the manifestation of civil law juris-
prudence. A look to these two transatlantic systems is justified by the fact
that both are federal in the sense that they represent a union of several
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sovereigns, and hence their experience with legal unification will serve
the global legal culture. Their dominance in that global legal culture
might be supported by their current influence on both the world culture
and the world's economy.
The vision of this Article can be no more than a look at the first gen-
eration. Strong and influential alternatives to these transatlantic legal
cultures will no doubt cause continual reworking of the global legal cul-
ture. Islamic law, for example, covers in some way perhaps a billion
people, nearly 19% of the world's population, or the same as the coverage
of the common law. It has shown a resilience and adaptability that guar-
antees that it will be a major factor in the final design of the world legal
culture. The Hindu legal family is said to cover 450 million people-a
greater population than the U.S. or all the E.U. countries combined. A
variety of indigenous legal cultures may emerge from under superficial
acceptance of the European legal systems. Non-transatlantic instincts,
such as the Chinese and Japan exultation of cooperative values over indi-
viduality, will also increasingly vie for place in the world's legal
philosophy. And history and humility tell us that there are influences,
philosophies, and value systems that cannot now be identified which will
someday change, perhaps radically, the make up of the legal system.
This Article then presents only a framework for contemplating the
future of the world's legal culture. It starts from the known dominant legal
regimes to offer only one of a large, perhaps infinite, variety of extensions
of these regimes into the world. And it has largely ignored the assured
influence of any number of alternatives. For example, it has not attempted
to predict the impact of human imagination and creativity on the emerg-
ing global legal culture. Still, I hope it is a fair start in envisioning the
substance and scope of our future global legal culture.
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